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“The next century will be a Turkish century” 
 
Turgut Özal, 19921 
 
“The Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were success stories. Now we have to reinvent this” 
 
Ahmet Davutoglu, 20092 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Turgut Özal, Turkey’s former Prime Minister and President might had extraordinary 
foreign policy senses, or perhaps he was just enthusiastic and lucky enough to say 
this, but he quite accurately predicted the rise of Turkey in the international field at 
the beginning of the 21st century. Ahmet Davutoglu, the current Turkish Foreign 
Minister’s words highlight a bit different, albeit more far-gone step on Turkey’s 
reinvented and reformulated foreign policy approach which the Turkish FM stated on 
a visit to the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo. Clear words, no doubt 
about that. The “visionary”3 Turkish FM aims high. Although, this reinvention did not 
come as a surprise, the current Turkish government has been systematically building 
the country’s new foreign policy since almost a decade. 
 
Twenty years ago study on Turkish foreign policy almost did not exist4. Turkish 
foreign policy has been studied since the Republic of Turkey was created in 1923, 
but the focus and emphasis was more placed on the country’s Western oriented 
approaches. Turkey’s Balkan policies were particularly neglected, except from a few 
academic articles, MA and PhD theses. 
However, since 2001, as a new and robustly strengthening political party has 
started to determine Turkey’s political life and arena, the picture changed completely 
                                                 
1 Laciner, Sedat. "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism" The Journal of Turkish Weekly. 9 
March 2009. 4 Apr. 2011 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-
policy-ozalism.html>. 
2 Cain, Phil. "Turkey: Seeking influence through mediation" globalpost. 12 Jan. 2011. 8 March 2011 <http:/ 
/www.globalpost.com/dispatch/turkey/110111/turkey-the-balkans-serbia-kosovo >. 
3 Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy" Foreign Policy. 20 May 2010. 10 March 2011 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=0,1>. 
4 Robins, Philip. "The 2005 BRISMES Lecture: A Double Gravity State: Turkish Foreign Policy 
Reconsidered" British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 33.2 (2006): 199-211. 
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and the attention turned to this sphere of Turkish foreign policy too, with academic 
works mushrooming on the horizon.  
 
The Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which 
was created on the ruins of the Islamist Fazilet Partisi/Virtue Party, 5  scored a 
sweeping victory on the 2002 general elections and secured a stable two-third 
majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. AK Party-leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul and an MP of the banned Islamist Refah 
Partisi/Welfare Party (RP), managed to gain the Prime Ministership after a short by-
pass and along with his fellow colleagues, especially with Davutoglu, started to 
reformulate and “reinvent” Turkish foreign policy.6 
 
Davutoglu, as an intellectual with serious academic background and knowledge, 
soon became the architect and key protagonist in shaping the AK Party’s world view 
and the reshaping of Turkish foreign policy. The current Turkish FM, who was first 
lifted to the position of chief advisor to the PM in 2009, started to completely 
retransfrom and remodel Turkey’s foreign policy. The policy’s prime pillars were 
basically untouched, although sometimes challenged, since the end of World War II.7 
The chief Turkish foreign affairs politician wanted to bring a new dimension, proactive 
stance, multidimensional foreign policy, “rhythmic diplomacy”8 into this new approach. 
Davutoglu wanted to use Turkish soft power, geographic position and economic 
potential to rethink Turkish foreign policy.9 
In addition, Turkey’s “Sevres phobia”10 is weakening – through this national security 
approach and the shaping of public attitude also changes – and with Davutoglu’s 
                                                 
5 Cizre, Ümit. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. New York: Routledge, 2008: 29-30. 
6 Not Davutoglu was the first one to challange the establishment of a more diverse Turkish foreign policy in this 
era, we should note that Ismail Cem – Turkey’s former FM – also emphasised peace, security and stability in the 
region, the importance of economic co-operation, cultural tolerance and Cem also understood that Turkey’s 
geostrategic, political and economic role extends beyond neighbouring regions. See also: Cem, Ismail. "Turkish 
Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons for Turkey at the Beginning of the New Millenium" Turkish Policy 
Quarterly 1.1. (2002): 1-6. 5 Apr. 2011 <http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2002-01-
futureofTRpolicy/TPQ2002-1-cem.pdf>. 
7 Danforth, Nicholas. "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP" Turkish 
Policy Quarterly 7.3. (2008): 83-95. 5 Apr. 2011 <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_vol7_no3_ni 
cholas_danforth.pdf>. 
8 Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy" Foreign Policy. 20 May 2010. 10 Mar. 2011 <h 
ttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=0,1>. 
9 Grigoradis, Ioannis N. "The Davutoglu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy" Hellenic Foundation for 
European and Foreign Policy Apr. 2010. 5 Apr. 2011 <http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%99%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%9F-
%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A3-8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf>. 
10 Kirisci, Kemal. "Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times" European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(EUISS) (2006): 32. 5 Apr. 2011 <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf>. 
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“zero problems policy”,11 which spreads to ex-Ottoman countries, this new approach 
aspires peaceful and constructive relationships with all states in neighbouring regions. 
Foreign Policy magazine even put Davutoglu to the position of the seventh top 
global thinker in 2010, stating that he is “the brains behind Turkey’s global 
reawakening” and he brought “impressive results” in Turkey’s foreign policy.12 
 
This new approach in the ex-Ottoman regions, which is many times referred as 
neo-Ottomanism in the West and denied by Davutoglu 13  – however on some 
occasions he confirms the name of this approach but emphasising that the concept is 
understood quite differently at home and abroad14 – concentrates on the Ottoman 
heritage and legacy, also highlighting Turkey’s central role in these states.15 The 
controversial expression16 fueled debates since the beginning of the 1990s, when the 
concept originally appeared and the new policy generates much attention since then.  
 
The proactiveness of Turkish foreign policy can not be just observed on the eastern, 
southern and northern borders of the country and in the international, global sphere, 
but on the west, in the Balkans – and in the European Union (EU) – too. Turkey, as a 
state committed toward EU integration, uses this new approach to cooperate and 
invest in those countries in the Balkans which once were the core European areas of 
the Ottoman Empire. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have Muslim 
pluralities or majorities and to facilitate relations with these states, which are given 
prospect of EU membership,17 Turkey and these three countries are tightening their 
relations – toward EU membership. The sustainability of this approach, due to 
criticisms and unknown factors ahead, is the question of the future, however Turkey 
can look positively into the upcoming years. The country’s aspirations to become a 
                                                 
11 Özcan, Mesut, and Ali Resul Usul. "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within 
Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?" The Journal of Turkish Weekly 6.21. (2010): 109-133. 6 April 
2011 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/files/article/392.pdf>. 
12 "100 Top Global Thinkers of 2010" Foreign Policy Dec. 2010: 45-46. 
13 Lately he completely denies that such a policy exists under this name. See also: Raxhimi, Altin. "Davutoglu: 
'I'm not a neo-Ottoman'" BalkanInsight. 26 Apr. 2011. 27 Apr. 2011 <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/a 
rticle/davutoglu-i-m-not-a-neo-ottoman>. 
14 Turkey's foreign minister denies neo-Ottoman remarks" News.Az. 25  Nov. 2009. 4 Apr. 2011 <http:/ 
/www.news.az/articles/turkey/3283>. 
15 Ülgen, Sinan. "A Place in the Sun of Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey's New Foreign 
Policy" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dec. 2010. 7 Apr. 2011 <http://carnegieendowme 
nt.org/files/turkey_new_foreign_policy.pdf>. 
16 Somun, Hajrudin. "Neo-Ottomanism: the Return of Turkey to the Balkans" Today's Zaman. 6 Oct. 2010. 6 
Apr. 2011 <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-223604-neo-ottomanism-the-return-of-turkey-to-the-balkans-
by-hajrudin-somun.html>. 
17 "EU-Western Balkans Relations" EurActiv. 22 Feb. 2011. 6 Apr. 2011 <http://www.euractiv.com/en/en 
largement/eu-western-balkans-relations-linksdossier-188295>. 
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“global actor”18 by 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, through these steps might be realised. 
 
My interest in Turkey and the country’s emerging role in the regional, and global, 
sphere started to intensify after I have participated in an international conference in 
northern Turkey in 2008. This focus has intensified when I became Balkans column 
editor at a major Hungarian online newspaper, and later becoming an editor of a 
Balkans based news agency. The selection of the topic of this thesis also shows this 
strengthened interest and the theoretically well underpinned approach make this 
issue a really special and challenging one. 
 
The hypothesis of the thesis is composed of that Turkey is realising neo-
Ottomanism in its foreign policy approach in three Balkan countries, namely Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, with which the country have had close 
historical, economic, cultural and political connections. This foreign policy approach is 
not just a traditional, or one could say “conventional”19 foreign policy initiative, no 
matter how Turkish politicians try to deny the questions related to neo-Ottomanism, it 
is a policy which affects many layers of these countries’ societies – and not just the 
political and economic field. This pattern fits into Turkey’s current foreign policy 
doctrine toward ex-Ottoman regions and the approach could also help the country’s 
approximation to the EU. The aim of the thesis is to analyse the points and key 
characteristics of this foreign policy approach in these countries, to provide a regional 
and European outlook through this channel and an answer regarding the hypothesis’ 
correctness and validity, with emphasis on Turkey’s – and these three countries – EU 
accession prospects. In addition, the thesis also aims to provide more information 
and analysis to a topic where there is a lack of research done in English language. 
 
The first chapter of the thesis aims to analyse what this policy basically means, 
what factors are encompassed in it and also to expose the principles and goals of 
neo-Ottomanism in the new Turkish foreign policy approach and to contrast its key 
points with previous Turkish foreign policy doctrines after World War II. Space will be 
                                                 
18 Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007" Insight Turkey 10.1 (2008): 77-
96. 
19 Özcan, Mesut, and Ali Resul Usul. "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within 
Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?" The Journal of Turkish Weekly 6.21. (2010): 109-133. 6 Apr. 
2011 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/files/article/392.pdf>. 
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devoted to the notion that why do I use the neo-Ottomanism expression regarding 
the Balkans and what grounding do I have for this. 
 
The following points aim to prove how neo-Ottomanism serves as the key tool to 
achieve success, or partial success and sometimes even end in failure, in Turkey’s 
approaches in these three countries. The thesis aims to show the limits of this policy 
in the recent international political landscape. Davutoglu’s, and the AK Party’s and 
government’s foreign policy visions thus appear in the relations with the above 
mentioned countries. 
This chapter also explores the criticisms toward Turkish foreign policy in these 
countries, why several politicians, the public opinion, analysts etc. oppose or support 
Turkish rapprochement to the region. 
 
The second chapter of the thesis concentrates on the Ottoman past and Turkey’s 
foreign policy approach to the region in the 20th century, providing a regional outlook 
with emphasis on the three countries in focus. The third chapter analyses Turkey’s 
relations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo today, how several 
aspects – political, economic, cultural etc. – of neo-Ottomanism are formulated in 
these states. I need to note here that this thesis takes Kosovo as an independent 
state according to the advisory opinion20 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and as most EU 21  and NATO 22  members also take Kosovo as an independent 
country. Turkey’s role as a mediator in the ongoing Kosovar-Serbian relations will be 
taken under analysis here too. The fourth chapter focuses on the implications of 
these countries EU membership prospects in connection with Turkey’s regional 
policies, both reflecting to the western Balkans’ and Turkey’s approximation and 
accession processes. 
Due to the extension limits of this thesis, the other countries of the Balkans are left 
out from the analysis. However, I need to note here that several countries, like Serbia, 
Bulgaria or even Greece in recent times, are also of much importance and have 
significant roles and position in current Turkish foreign policy. The choice, among 
many highlighted previously, fell on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo 
                                                 
20 "Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo 
(Request for Advisory Opinion)" International Court of Justice. 22 Jul. 2010. 6 Apr. 2011 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=6>. 
21 "European Parliament urges EU members to recognise Kosovo" SETimes.com. 9 Jul. 2010. 3 Apr. 2011 
<http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/07/09/feature-01>. 
22 "Countries that have recognised the Republic of Kosova" Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 Feb. 2011. 25 Apr. 
2011 <http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33>.  
 6
because these countries have significant Muslim populations, do not have fast EU 
membership prospects and their economy is also considerably less developed than 
other surrounding nations 23 24  – there is a space and vacuum for Turkey to 
manoeuvre,  to develop and enhance relations in the region. 
 
Last, but not least, the fifth chapter will provide a conclusion for the whole thesis, 
assess the findings, the hypothesis and aims to formulate scenarios of neo-
Ottomanism in which direction this policy approach could turn in the future. 
 
The approach of the thesis is basically a policy analysis, assessing, analysing and 
reflecting to neo-Ottomanism, focusing on the process of this policy, how it developed 
during recent years. I will also devote space to criticisms which also question the 
policy’s current existense. 
I have primarily used primary resources for my thesis, ranging from academic 
books, articles, MA theses, magazine, newspaper articles, interviews made with 
several Turkish and Bosnian intellectuals and interviews published on webpages of 
several news organisations, government documents, data from international 
organisations, abstracts from conferences, maps and a diverse collection of analysis 
made by various institutes – government affiliated and non-government affiliated, 
from the Balkans and from elsewhere. Some of the assistant materials will be 
presented in the appendices of thesis. 
I used a qualitative and – many times – a comparative method of the accumulated 
information and materials, assessing the three states in focus to one another and to 
provide a thorough and extensive work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 "Country comparison: GDP - per capita (PPP)" CIA: The World Factbook. updated weekly. 2 Apr. 2011 <htt 
ps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html>. 
24 Bulgaria and Greece also have considerably great number of Turkish minorities but these countries are already 
EU members, they are economically more developed and because these two states are already EU members there 
is less potential for Turkey to develop several kinds, economic for example, of relations – the bargaining 
possibilities with individual states, like Albania, are many times easier than with the 27 member block. 
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1. The new Turkish foreign policy approach 
1.1 The Ottoman legacy, Davutoglu’s new approach, key points of today’s 
Turkish foreign policy 
 
Most new policy approaches do not appear without any antecedents. The post-Cold 
War era brought a completely new political situation and Turkey also needed to 
reconceptualise its foreign policy strategy. However, this reframing took some years 
and a clearly defined concept only appeared with the publication of Davutoglu’s 
“Strategic Depth” in 2001.25 The book was greatly ignored at that time but the 2002 
general elections in Turkey, when the AK Party was voted into power, completely 
changed the picture, Davutoglu became chief foreign policy advisor to the PM. 
Foreign policy changes also have different meanings26 and I will examine some 
parts of this issue. Nonetheless, before we take a look at this and from what ideas 
Davutoglu drew his strategy, we should mention the key points of Ottomanism, an 
expression and concept which emerged in the second half of the 19th century, with 
which the current FM’s ideas show interesting connection points. 
 
1.1.1 Ottomanism 
 
Ottomanism27 emerged as an idea to preserve the disintegrating Empire, but the 
decline approached rapidly and became really visible in the 19th century.28 The theory 
aimed at creating an Ottoman nation by providing equal political rights and duties for 
both Muslims and non-Muslims residing on the territory of the Ottoman Empire29 to 
preserve the country as one entity. Ottomanism wanted to “regenerate” the state,30 a 
common Ottoman citizenship and constitution was created31  but revolutionary ideas 
                                                 
25 Grigoradis, Ioannis N. "The Davutoglu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy" Hellenic Foundation for 
European and Foreign Policy 2010. 5 Apr. 2011 <http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%99%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%9F-
%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A3-8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf>. 
26 Özcan, Mesut, and Ali Resul Usul. "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within 
Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?" The Journal of Turkish Weekly 6.21. (2010): 110-112. 6 Apr. 
2011 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/files/article/392.pdf>. 
27 I need to note here that Ottomanism had nothing to do with foreign policy, at that time those countries which 
are now independent, belonged to the Ottoman Empire. However, the concept and ideological background are 
worth to draw some linking points. 
28 Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1968. 
29 Eligür, Banu. The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010: 39. 
30 Mayall, Simon V. Turkey: Thwarted Ambition. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997: 
12 
31 Dodd, C. H.. "The Development of Turkish Democracy" British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19.1 (1992): 
16-30. 
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from France – mainly nationalism started to spread, first in the Balkans32 – provided a 
powerful tool first for individual liberties 33  then on a bigger, national scale too. 
However, Ottomanism did not embraced non-Turkish symbols and during the Young 
Turk era, at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, it heavily got 
embedded with ideas of Turkification and Turkish nationalism. 34 The foundations and 
the ideas behind the ideology encompassed great changes compared to previous 
Ottoman policies but in practise it did not work out. 
 
1.1.2 Turkey’s new foreign policy 
 
Turkey’s new foreign policy approach can be characterised by several meanings of 
policy change: an adjustment and – disputedly – a program change is taking place 
currently.35 Adjustment change in the meaning of providing more efforts to a cause, 
namely putting more emphasis in the country’s EU accession process36 and creating 
a multidimensional policy sphere, balancing the Western oriented Turkish foreign 
policy with northern, eastern and southern dimensions. This approach – in the eyes 
of some experts and authors37 – can be seen as a radical program change, however, 
this issue is highly controversial and Turkish decision makers deny the existence of 
this U-turn. The new Turkish foreign policy doctrine was introduced in Davutoglu’s 
2001 book “Strategic Depth” and the changes followed due course. 
First, we need to see that the policy changes and the reconceptualisation of Turkish 
foreign policy are intertwined. The concept of “strategic depth” encompasses multiple 
points, which were previously not that stressed in the country’s foreign policy 
approach. These include an intensive focus on Turkey’s historical and cultural 
traditions, the Ottoman legacy, the country’s geopolitical importance, a 
multidimensional foreign policy, Turkey’s “soft power” possibilities, 38  settling all 
problematic issues with neighbouring countries (“zero problem policy”). In addition, 
                                                 
32 Altunisik, Meliha Benli, and Özlem Tür. Turkey: Challenges of continuity and change. New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2005: 2-3. 
33 Yavuz, Hakan, and Özlem Tür. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003: 
42-43. 
34 Ülker, Erol. "Empires and Nation Building: Russification and Turkification Compared" Diss. Central 
European University, 2004. Web. 4 Apr. 2011. <http://web.ceu.hu/nation/theses/ukler0304.pdf>. 
35 Özcan, Mesut, and Ali Resul Usul. "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within 
Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?" The Journal of Turkish Weekly 6.21. (2010): 109-133. 6 Apr. 
2011 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/files/article/392.pdf>. 
36 Özcan, Mesut. Harmonizing Foreign Policy Turkey, the EU and the Middle East. Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008: 157. 
37 Köprülü, Kemal. "Paradigm Shift in Turkey's Foreign Policy" Brown Journal of World Affairs 16.1 (2009): 
185-197. 
38 Oguzlu, Tarik. "Soft power in Turkish foreign policy" Australian Journal of International Affairs 61.1 (2007): 
81-97. 
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other points encompass taking Turkey as a “central country” which is able and should 
guarantee its own security and stability by a more active foreign policy to establish 
itself as an important international player.39 Turkey’s position as a regional power is 
already realised. If all of these conditions could be fulfilled then the desired “Pax 
Ottomana”40 or “Ottoman peace”41 would be in sight of reach. 
 
The concept of strategic depth builds on Turkey’s historical and geostrategic depth, 
strength in the region.42 Davutoglu takes Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Ottomans were the ones who united the Muslims under one flag.43 Today 
Turkey still has the ability to act as a – not just – regional player to achieve this. 
Turkey lies in a basin of an intersection point of north and south, east and west, has 
several “cross border spheres of influence”,44 with controlling the Turkish Straits too. 
Abdullah Gül, President of Turkey claimed in 2009 for example45 that “Turkey, surely, 
is moving simultaneously in every direction”. This approach tries to counterweight the 
country’s Western Kemalist foreign policy engagements, which looked more to the 
West, and widened up the possibilities, also emphasising the country’s independent 
stance and voice in foreign policy: Turkey can and should engage itself in policies 
from the Balkans through the Middle East to the Caucasus, Caspian and Central Asia 
because of this historical embeddedness.  
Establishing peaceful contacts with dozens of countries in all these areas are not of 
any hardships. Davutoglu therefore embraced the concept of “zero problems policy”, 
which reflects a radical change to previous Turkish foreign policies. He facilitates the 
settlement of disputes, changing disagreements to cooperation, creating a “win-win” 
situation 46  into a mutually beneficial and interlocking process. 47  These ongoing, 
                                                 
39 Ülgen, Sinan. "A Place in the Sun of Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey's New Foreign 
Policy" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 2010. 7 Apr. 2011 <http://carnegieendow 
ment.org/files/turkey_new_foreign_policy.pdf>. 
40 Pope, Hugh. "Turkey: Pax Ottomana?" Foreign Affairs 89.6 (2010): 161-171. 
41 Türköne, Mümtazer. "New Ottomans" Today's Zaman. 18 December 2010. 7 Apr. 2011 <http://www.todaysz 
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(2006): 945-964. 
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albeit at some stages bumpy and obstacled, rapprochement with neighbouring 
countries, like Greece or Syria, are clearly of a sign of this new approach. Zero 
problems policy opens new mechanisms for Turkey for cooperation with neighbouring 
states; economic, visa, cultural, free trade agreements (FTA) are made – with Syria 
and Georgia for example48 – and Turkey takes part actively in trade liberalisation 
agreements and organisations, with emerging onto a donor level too. 49  The 
abolishment of visas for Turkish citizens into more than a dozen of countries50 in the 
past years – and perhaps more to follow –, reaching the number of 62 countries for 
visa-free travel, resulted in a robust trade volume increase too, with tourism and 
further economic cooperation expected to boost.51 
 
Turkish foreign policy also embraces the ideas of creating peace, security, stability, 
prosperity52 mainly through increasing economic interdependence with neighbouring 
countries.53  Turkey also acts more and more as a mediator in the regional, and in 
the global sphere too.54 One of the main reasons why Turkey proactively behaves in 
these relations is because the country has more regional identities,55  not just a 
Western/European one – as it was much emphasised by Kemalist forces. The cross-
continental country has the ability and possibility to make space and manoeuvre in 
more regions and the state has multidimensional foreign policy priorities, instead of a 
single one. 56  This multidimensionality also serves as a balanced policy for 
maintaining equal distance from all participating sides and acts as a mediating field 
between opponents (the EU vs. Iran for example) in the region and even beyond.  
 
I have made a brief indication how Turkey’s soft power plays a role in its foreign 
policy approach but I should also mention how parts of this concept could help 
                                                 
48 Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007" Insight Turkey 10.1 (2008): 77-
96. 
49 "Turkey gives US$1 million to the EIF to help poorest countries on trade" World Trade Organization. 30 
September 2010. 8 Apr. 2011 <Turkey gives US$1 million to the EIF to help poorest countries on trade>. 
50 Yavuz, Ercan. "Trade booming with neigbors as visa requirements abolished" Today's Zaman. 30 Jan. 2011. 9 
Apr. 2010 <http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=233908>. 
51 Yavuz, Ercan. "Turkey, Lebanon sign deal to abolish visa requirements" Today's Zaman. 12 Jan. 2010. 8 Apr. 
2011 <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-198273-turkey-lebanon-sign-deal-to-abolish-visa-requirement.html>. 
52 Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy" Foreign Policy. 20 May 2010. 10 March 2011 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=0,1>. 
53 Zalewski, Piotr. "The Self-Appointed Superpower" World Policy Institute 2010-11. Winter (2010): 97-102. 21 
Apr. 2011 <http://www.worldpolicy.org/sites/default/files/uploaded/image/WPJ-Winter2010-11-Zalewski-
Turkey.pdf>. 
54 Önis, Ziya, and Suhnaz Yilmaz. "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in 
Turkey during the AKP Era" Turkish Studies 10.1 (2009): 7-24. 
55 Oguzlu, Tarik. "Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the 
West?" Turkish Studies 9.1 (2008): 3-16. 
56 Criss, Nur Bilge. "Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP Governments" UNISCI Journal 8.2. 
(2010). 15 Apr. 2011 <http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2023%20-%20BILGE.pdf>. 
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adding to the development of this arena too. The expression of “conservative 
democracy”, with adjustments to Islamic values,57 clearly provides stable grounds for 
Turkey’s increasing involvement in international organisations with putting also a 
stress on the compatibility of Western and Muslim traditions. The AK Party is keen on 
to promote its ability to be open for all respective sides and engage in discourse 
regarding this question. The Turkish government perceives democracy as the 
country’s most important soft power.58 Moreover, Turkish governments since 2002 
aim to draw in all involved and related actors into problem-solving and other 
initiatives, with showing a constructive and non-biased – this is debated – foreign 
policy approach. In addition, due to the political and constitutional reforms in Turkey59 
economic growth and consolidation started to characterise the country. Turkey is 
increasingly involved in major international organisations – on many occasions 
Turkish nationals and Turkey occupy top jobs –, such as in the Organisation of The 
Islamic Conference (OIC), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), G20, non-
permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, South-East 
European Cooperation Process (SEECP), Council of Europe and the Organisation of 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The country also co-operates with 
countries in the Gulf Coordination Council, Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and Southern Common Market (Mercosur). This “all-inclusive” diplomacy, 
as it was put down quite smartly, 60  also tries to mobilise NGOs, business 
communities and other civil actors in support of the government’s foreign policy aims, 
creating an all-field covered policy strategy to implement Turkey’s international 
desires. 
Davutoglu has managed to become an extremely influential actor in the Turkish 
government61 and all of the above mentioned reasons and facts could contribute to 
the notion of this dynamic diplomacy, which helps Turkey today to come forward with 
a more confident, responsible and proactive foreign policy approach, with focuses 
shifting onto the global stage too. 
 
 
                                                 
57 Cizre, Ümit. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. New York: Routledge, 2008: 76. old 
58 Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007" Insight Turkey 10.1 (2008): 77-
96. 
59 Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007" Insight Turkey 10.1 (2008): 77-
96. 
60 Aras, Bülent. "The Davutoglu era in Turkish foreign policy" Insight Turkey 11.3 (2009): 127-142. 
61 Grigoradis, Ioannis N. "The Davutoglu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy" Hellenic Foundation for 
European and Foreign Policy 2010. 5 Apr. 2011 <http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%99%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%9F-
%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A3-8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf>. 
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1.2 Neo-Ottomanism, the general view and accusations on this approach of 
Turkish foreign policy 
 
Davutoglu’s ideas, the “strategic depth” and Turkey’s new foreign policy approach 
have interesting ideological roots in neo-Ottomanism, a concept appeared and put in 
practise during Turgut Özal’s Prime Ministership (1983-1989) and Presidential period 
(1989-1993). Davutoglu consistently denies being a neo-Ottoman, although, the 
concept and expression is not clearly defined as of today62 and flexibly changed 
during the course of the last more than three decades. Neo-Ottomanism, first coined 
by well-known columnist and Middle East, Balkans expert Cengiz Candar,63 has been 
characterised by some authors being as an aggressive foreign policy, a pan-Turkist, 
a pan-Islamic or even an irredentist movement.64 However, the question is not this 
simple and easy to answer. 
 
1.2.1 Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanism 
 
Özal realised the need for change and the opportunities, especially with the fall of 
the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the USSR, and aimed to establish political, 
economic and cultural ties with those areas – abandoning isolatianism – which once 
belonged to the Ottoman Empire and even beyond (e.g. Russia).65 These contacts 
and relationships were absent during the Cold War and having established these 
new connections – mainly through the field of economy – a more internationalist, 
active foreign policy was needed to protect the country’s economic interests in these 
regions. Turkey “opened up” and started to rediscover its Muslim identity.66 Özalist 
neo-Ottomanism (and neo-Turanism) also focused on the cultural aspects of these 
relations. He emphasised that Turkey is naturally part of the Islamic, Turkish (Turkic) 
                                                 
62 Rüma, Inan. "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Balkans: New Activism, Neo-Ottomanism or/so 
what?" Turkish Policy Quarterly 9.4. (2011): 133-140. 21 Apr. 2011 <http://www.turkishpolicy.com/do 
syalar/files/%C4%B0nan%20R%C3%BCma-Turkey's%20Policy%20towards%20the%20Balkans(1).pdf>. 
63 Sandrin, Paula. "Turkish Foreign Policy after the End of Cold War: From Securitising to Desecuritising 
Actor" London School of Economics (2009): 7. 21 Apr. 2011 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source= 
web&cd=1&ved=0CBYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww2.lse.ac.uk%2FeuropeanInstitute%2Fresearch%2F
ContemporaryTurkishStudies%2FPaper%2520PS.pdf&ei=FW7KTaXuMMOD-wazu5CuAw&usg=AFQjCNG-
mVUhynl589cu-PmKBTS9R_nvWA >.  
64 Laciner, Sedat. "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism" The Journal of Turkish Weekly. 9 
March 2009. 4 Apr. 2011 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-
policy-ozalism.html>. 
65 Laciner, Sedat. "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism" The Journal of Turkish Weekly. 9 
March 2009. 4 Apr. 2011 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-
policy-ozalism.html>.  
66 Alessandri, Emiliano. "The New Turkish Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations"Istituto Affari 
Internazionali. Feb. 2010. 21 Apr. 2011 <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai1003.pdf>. 
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and Ottoman world and Turkey could be a model country for the states in the 
region,67 even a central state in that geographical space. Kemalism viewed Turks 
outside of Turkey as a dangerous factor, however, for neo-Ottomans outside Turks 
and the Turkish diaspora spread all around Europe were a possibility for co-operation 
and improving bilateral relations. Neo-Ottomans, and especially Özal, considered the 
Turkist, Islamist and Ottomanist factors not to be abandoned from the country’s EU 
accession aims. Turkey’s national interest, independence views were reformulated 
according to these concepts and Özal tried to make it clear that a Turkey with its 
good relations with regional states would be the best to integrate into the EU. 
Özalist policies also changed the economic structure of Turkey, started to privatise 
companies, liberalise the market mainly to boost exports68 and reduced the power of 
the military – a crucial point in the history of Turkish democracy. 
However, after Özal deceased in 1993, neo-Ottomanism as a policy was 
abandoned and foreign policy concentrated on the security aspects, namely to 
eliminate and fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist 
organisation.69707172 
 
Özalist neo-Ottomanism was perceived by suspicion in those states which once 
belonged to the Ottoman Empire,73 many of them saw this approach as the revival of 
the Ottoman imperial era and did not like the paternalistic tone, which Turkey was 
                                                 
67 Sinan Ülgen suggests that Turkey could serve as a relevant example in today’s revolts and transformations in 
the Arab world for the countries there, but he warns to avoid drawing much parallels with Turkey. On the other 
hand, some connection points could be drawn between Özal’s vision and Ülgen’s statements in connection to 
possibilities for Turkey to become a leading power in democratic norms, human rights promotion and state 
structure change in the region. See: Ülgen, Sinan. "The Future of Democracy in the Arab World: How Relevant 
is the Turkish Experience?" European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Feb. 2011. 21 Apr. 2011 
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/The_Turkish_experience.pdf>. 
68 Lovatt, Debbie ed. Turkey since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001: 22-25. 
69 Criss, Nur Bilge. "Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP Governments" UNISCI Journal 8.2. 
(2010). 15 Apr. 2011 <http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2023%20-%20BILGE.pdf>. 
70 I need to add here, that multipolar tendencies did not stop after the death of Özal, Necmettin Erbakan, 
Turkey’s first openly Islamist PM between 1996 and 1997, also wanted to foster relations with neighbouring 
countries, but only with Muslim ones, to create an alternative to the alliance with the Western world. However, 
the secularist elite, the judiciary and the military did not observe this without any vindications and the military 
staged a “postmodern coup” against his government in 1997. See also: Yavuz, Hakan, and Özlem Tür. Islamic 
Political Identity in Turkey. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003: 243-245. 
71 Ismail Cem, FM of Turkey between 1999 and 2002 also favoured a multidimensional proactive foreign policy, 
with a Western emphasis. See: Önis, Ziya. "Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying 
Dynamics and a Critique" Insight Turkey 13.1 (2011): 47-65. 
72 Suleyman Demirel, Turkey’s President between 1993 and 2000 also emphasised a multiregional foreign policy, 
however, he focused on the Black Sea Region. See also: Ülgen, Sinan. "A Place in the Sun of Fifteen Minutes of 
Fame? Understanding Turkey's New Foreign Policy" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 
2010. 7 April 2011 <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/turkey_new_foreign_policy.pdf>. 
73 Danforth, Nicholas. "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP" Turkish 
Policy Quarterly 7.3. (2008): 83-95. 5 April 2011 <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_vol7_no3_ni 
cholas_danforth.pdf>. 
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using. 74  The Balkans was a crucial space for Özal’s foreign policy approach, 75 
countries that had problems with Serbia and Greece – such as FYROM/Macedonia, 
Albania – turned to Ankara for co-operation. Bulgaria, Romania and (half of) Bosnia  
also started to normalise relations with Turkey and the growing friendships between 
Turkey and these countries embarrassed Greece especially. The Hellenic state first 
observed this approach as Turkey wanted to circle around Greece with Muslim and 
Ottoman subjects, therefore creating a Muslim-Orthodox competition in the region. 
However, Greece later dropped this approach when it realised that Turkey’s 
ambitions were not formulated as an insult on the Hellenic state.  
 
1.2.2 Neo-Ottomanism today 
 
The current Turkish foreign policy approach regarding the ex-Ottoman sphere, no 
matter how Davutoglu is emphasising its differentness, is primarily rooted in those 
times’ neo-Ottomanism. The connection points are to be observed at many instances: 
 
• the openness of Turkish foreign policy, 
• concentrating on the Ottoman legacy and cultural relations, 
• the focus on economic co-operation and interdependence, 
• the revival of Islam and Islamic values in both domestic – no threat in Kurdish 
cultural rights and national identity as long as Kurds are loyal to the Republic 
of Turkey76 – and foreign policy, 
• the multidimensionality of foreign policy with as much emphasis on north, east, 
south, like on the west, 
• peaceful approach to countries in the region, 
• the more macro and all-level perspective, 
• taking Turkey as a central country, 
• and that both Özal’s and Davutoglu’s views do not call for Turkish imperialism. 
 
                                                 
74 Fisher Onar, Nora. "Neo Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy" Centre for Economics 
and Foreign Policy Studies. Oct. 2009. 21 Apr. 2011 <http://www.edam.org.tr/images/PDF/yayin 
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75 Laciner, Sedat. "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism" The Journal of Turkish Weekly. 9 
March 2009. 4 Apr. 2011 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-
policy-ozalism.html>. 
76 Taspinar, Ömer. "Turkey’s Middle East Policies Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism" Carnegie 
Endowment. Sep. 2008. 21 Apr. 2011 <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf>. 
 15
On the other hand, there are three clear cut, main differences between the two 
approaches: 
 
• Turkey now proceeds with its zero problem policy with engaging in peaceful 
and problem-solving discourse with all of its neighbours and even acting as a 
mediator in several occasions, 
• the current Turkish foreign policy toward ex-Ottoman states does not aim to 
openly become the leading state of the region – it is not even possible to 
reach, there are more major actors involved (EU, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) 
–, but to calmly go ahead with its soft power approximation in all directions, 
• and Turkey does not promote paternalistic ways towards countries of the ex-
Ottoman Empire and stress its greatness. 
 
The accusations that the whole Turkish foreign policy face today, such as that it has 
disregarded its Western values, the country turns away from the West,77 promotes a 
hidden Islamist agenda,78 pursues an anti-Western policy on the Middle East are of 
simplistic arguments. In addition, critics attach a pejorative meaning to neo-
Ottomanism with emphasising Turkey’s Eastern and Ottoman-era aspirations. The 
issue is more complex than this. Turkey is not going to turn into an Iran.79 Neo-
Ottomanism, emphasis on its Middle East and – disputedly – Islamic policies, is many 
times used to fuel the debate around Turkey’s Westernness and Islamic values. The 
current AK Party government is more appealing to religious crowds and the majority 
of its women membership wears headscarf80 – this issue remains a divisive domestic 
topic81 – but this does not mean that Turkey is turning its back on the West. Erdogan 
consequently objects and speaks out against radical Islamism. The AK Party has 
deep ideological, historical (focus on Ottoman past) and value roots in the Islamist 
RP,82 Fazilet Partisi/Virtue Party (FP) and even Özal’s Anavatan Partisi/Motherland 
Party (ANAP). However, the current governing party has established itself as a 
                                                 
77 Danforth, Nick. "How the West Lost Turkey" Foreign Policy. 25 Nov. 2009. 10 Apr. 2011 <http://www.f 
oreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/25/how_the_west_lost_turkey?page=0,0>. 
78 Taspinar, Ömer. "Turkey’s Middle East Policies Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism" Carnegie 
Endowment. Sep. 2008. 21 Apr. 2011 <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar 
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79 "Is Turkey turning its back on the West?" The Economist. 21 Oct. 2010. 10 Apr. 2011 <http://www.econom 
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80 Jenkins, Gareth. Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
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reformist political organisation, which uses moderate and democratic language, 
defining itself as a conservative, rather than an Islamist political power.83 
 
The Turkish disputes with Western countries are many times portrayed as 
civilisational clashes, but these reflect another viewpoint here: Turkey participates in 
the Alliance of Civilisations for example to overcome the differences and contribute to 
the co-existence of Islamic and Western societies. 84  The Turkish public sees 
Western civilisation as a basically good thing and its values and norms are 
compatible with Turkish and Islamic culture. The main problem is Western politics, 
policies which are seen as negative and, many times, hostile. The disagreements 
with the West and Israel over several issues – Iran, the Gaza Strip or Sudan for 
example – are partly built on these grounds, Turkey is critical of the West’s policies 
directed to Turkey and other Muslim countries. However, these disputes are also of a 
sign of a more independent, assertive and confident Turkish foreign policy; the 
Turkish state is rethinking its position in the world.85 Turkey, in line with the zero 
problems policy, tries to avoid clashes of any kind with any country, especially 
economically important ones, like Iran. Nonetheless, EU membership still remains top 
priority. Both the West and Turkey wants stability in the Balkans and the Middle East, 
Afghanistan should not be left behind to the Taliban and the faith in democracy and 
human rights are just some of the key points in which both the West and Turkey 
agree.  
 
Another interesting phenomenon here is that Turkey did not engage much in issues 
in connection with the ex-Ottoman and Arab world in the past more than 80 years 
and that could be one of the reasons why the country’s current foreign policy might 
seem strange and surprising. For some countries, and perhaps even for the EU, 
Ankara’s newly diversified focus has come “out of the blue”, they were not prepared 
(and able) to understand, answer and handle Turkey’s multidimensional approaches. 
These have contributed to bumps in the relations, 86  cooled down Turkey-EU 
negotiations and disagreements popped up with the US in connection with the war in 
Iraq. The confusion perceived in foreign states, which occasionally surrounds 
                                                 
83 Cizre, Ümit. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. New York: Routledge, 2008: 110-112. 
84 Bülbül, Kudret, Bekir Berat Özipek, and Ibrahim Kalin. "Turkish perceptions of the West" Insight Turkey 10.1 
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86 Robins, Philip. "Turkish foreign policy since 2002: between a ‘post-Islamist’ government and a Kemalist 
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Turkey’s foreign policy steps, can be due to the notion that Turkey’s acts at some 
points may contradict each other.87 Turkey – which embraces many Western values, 
including democracy, respects and promotes human rights and international law – 
wants to be a regional power in a geographical space where there is (was) always a 
suspicion towards the West, Israel and the US. The balancing and careful Turkish 
diplomacy practise aims to manoeuvre between these buoys, but it is sometimes 
really hard to explain in the West why Erdogan supports the President of Sudan for 
example. 
 
1.2.3 Neo-Ottomanism: a different meaning 
 
Nevertheless, today’s Turkish foreign policy is on the rise but it is understandable, 
why Davutoglu and other Turkish politicians fear and do not like the usage of neo-
Ottomanism. It still has pejorative meanings – as we have seen it –, the definition is 
not clearly defined, everything could fit into this expression, and letting the word 
“Ottoman” remain in it could recall negative memories from the Ottoman past. 
However, we need to understand that policies can be filled with more positive and 
constructive meanings as the time goes by, Davutoglu is exerting on this. However, 
he considers neo-Ottomanism as too simplistic and he proceeds with more careful 
wording because Kemalist forces observe neo-Ottomanism as a policy to undermine 
Atatürk’s legacy.88 
 
Nonetheless, I do stick to the usage of neo-Ottomanism regarding the Balkans 
because of the following reasons. In the previous section I tried to reveal the 
connection parts between Özal’s and Davutoglu’s neo-Ottomanism and I think that 
the similarities overwhelm the differences. Secondly, in my opinion the concept has 
been exploited mainly in negative ways, and times have long gone when countries 
once belonged to the Ottoman Empire needed to be afraid of Ottoman expansionism 
and imperialism. Therefore, I would like to provoke a bit by using the expression 
simply as describing the current Turkish foreign policy approach in the Balkans to 
underline the concept’s traditions and linking points, not providing with this usage 
accusations or pejorative meanings to it. I just try to point to the matters, that 
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because the definition of the expression is not clearly defined, it could be filled in with 
many other elements, which were not emphasised in the media, especially in 
Western newspapers and magazines. In addition, as many countries in the Balkans 
welcome Turkey’s political, economic and cultural approximation – with emerging 
mutual economic benefits in particular – puts the Ottoman past in a completely 
different light. In addition, we need to see that the current Turkish foreign policy 
toward the region is not just a traditional foreign policy approach: it encompasses 
overarching historical, political, economic, cultural – and religious – issues, affecting 
societies in a whole and not just a small proportion of it. Some experts also attach the 
notion that there is a great similarity between the mentality of Turkish and Kosovar 
people for example.89 
The “rebranding” of neo-Ottomanism has been already started and whatever name 
politicians attach to it, it still encompasses those attributes, the arch of which date 
back until Ottoman times, continued through Özal’s views and expanded in today’s 
AK Party era. 
 
 
1.3 Criticisms toward Turkey’s new foreign policy approach in the Balkans 
 
In this chapter I will present and analyse the criticisms which are in connection with 
the usage of the expression neo-Ottomanism, particularly linked to the Balkans. Neo-
Ottomanism is understood here as a policy not under my terms which I have 
highlighted in the previous section, but as an approach used by most of the people 
who deal with this topic. 
The quotes are from the interviews which I have made with Bosnian and Turkish 
intellectuals. 
 
1.3.1 Neo-Ottomanism: a word to avoid 
 
Basically we can differentiate between two great criticisms regarding neo-
Ottomanism. The first is a complete denial of the expression, it does not exist and 
people usually use neo-Ottomanism in a pejorative way to highlight Turkey’s 
perceived imperial aspirations in the ex-Ottoman world. Turkish politicians, and 
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especially Davutoglu, are really keen on not use the word and deny that such a policy 
exists.90 However, Ottoman multiculturalism and the positive aspects of the Ottoman 
past are worth to take into account here, according to the Turkish FM. 
The reasons, which would underpin the non-usage of neo-Ottomanism are multifold. 
First of all Ottomanism, from where neo-Ottomanism is considered to come from, has 
never had any connotation to foreign policy. Harun Karcic, a Sarajevo based former 
researcher at the Roberto Ruffilli Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of 
Bologna and a member of Islam in South East Europe Forum (ISEEF) elaborates this 
question from this perspective: 
 
“First of all, Ottomanism was a term coined by Ottoman statesmen in the 
19th century to try and forge a common Ottoman identity in the wake of ever 
stronger nationalist movements in the Balkans and Middle East 
which threatened the political and social stability of the Empire. The term 
never had any connotation to Ottoman foreign policy, it was simply an 
attempt at forging a common identity. Hence, labeling Turkish foreign policy 
as 'neo-Ottoman' is simply wrong. I would simply label it as the 'new Turkish 
foreign policy'. We have to bear in mind that Turkey has been largely 
ignoring its neighboring countries (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Armenia, 
Greece) in the last couple of decades. It was desperately trying to get closer 
to the Europe, and applied for EEC membership a few decades ago. 
However, Europe has been divided on Turkey's entrance and Turkish 
leadership and the ordinary people became increasingly frustrated with the 
EU. Since the AKP came to power, the Turkish leadership tried to make use 
of its immediate neighbourhood for its own economic gain as well as for 
political stability.”91 
 
Turkey’s “rediscovery” of its neighbourhood is nothing new according to this 
interpretation and the EU’s reluctance with the Turkish EU membership provided an 
impetus for this increased involvement with neighbouring regions. 
The second of the reasons why neo-Ottomanism is not an existing policy is pretty 
simple: Turkey has not enough resources and capabilities to put such a policy into 
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practise. As Cengiz Aktar, Professor at Turkey’s Bahcesehir University and the 
Chariman of the Department of EU Relations in Istanbul puts it: 
 
“The intention is good in a way but the realisation, plus the capabilities of 
Turkey to put such a policy in place are highly doubtful.”92 
 
This view is also supported by other opinions,93 that Turkey has limited economic 
and diplomatic resources at its disposal to impose an overarching policy, 
concentrating on every aspects of a foreign policy approach. This is also true for 
Turkey’s mediating role, its unilateral “referee position” can not work alone, other 
international support is needed due to this lack of resources. 
A third point in this matter is that Turkey does not want to revive the Ottoman  
Empire, it is not in its interests. However, the multicultural and multifaceted heritage 
of the Ottoman Empire is something on which the country could build on, according 
to Cengiz Aktar: 
 
“I don’t think that today we can talk about the revival of the Ottoman Empire, 
although a multiethnic, a multireligious Ottoman or the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire we are aiming at. After all, what is the European Union?” 
 
Interestingly, as I have noted in sub-chapter 1.2, many criticisms point to the matter 
that Turkey has disregarded its Western values and is turning away from the West. 
However, from the the point of the increased Turkish interest in the Balkans, Turkish 
foreign policy regarding this region is not a departure from Europe and the West, 
because the Ottoman state was in practise a European, rather than an Asian entity.94 
Therefore, Turkey’s new foreign policy initiative to this region is also not a matter of 
value choice between neo-Ottomanism and the West because it has embraced 
Western values long time ago. 
One of the last factors which could contribute to the point that neo-Ottomanism 
does not exist as a policy is that since the early 2000s the EU and the US showed 
relative indifference toward the Balkans. Muzaffer Vatensever, Balkans expert of the 
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Ankara based International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK) says 95  that 
Turkey – a country which could speak the language of the region – and its initiatives 
are trying to move forward the situation in the field of peace, security and stability in 
the region but if this does not get any help, the effects of these approaches will not 
last long. Cengiz Aktar affirms these views, he adds that western Europeans were 
(are) not interested in the region and Turkey stepped in, rediscovered the Balkans. 
Selvet Cetin, an expert at the Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE) in Ankara says96 
that Turkey has also a balancing role in the region, it can not abandon it because it 
could have great consequences. 
 
Regarding religion, to answer those accusations which state that Turkey uses Islam 
as a factor in its foreign policy in the Balkans, Harun Karcic claims that: 
 
“Islam does not play a role in Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans. Turkey 
today has greater trade with Orthodox majority countries such as Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania, and Serbia than it has with Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo. 
Although, Turkey could use its religious connections in the Balkans, Balkan 
Muslims are, after half a century of communism, too secularised to see it as 
a major link.”  
 
1.3.2 Opposition toward increasing Turkish relations 
 
The second great criticism regarding neo-Ottomanism is not the denial of the 
expression, people who criticise this do believe that the expression and policy exists, 
but the increased involvement of Turkey in the ex-Ottoman sphere is in line with neo-
Ottoman policies. These kinds of criticisms primarily come from Greek, Serb and 
Western intellectuals, politicians, whereas the first type of criticism, that neo-
Ottomanism does not even exist, is emphasised mostly by Turkish, Bosnian (Bosniak) 
and some Western intellectuals, politicians. 
 
The first aspect of the opinions in opposition to increasing Turkish relations is that 
Turkey is biased regarding the countries in the region, it favours Muslims in the 
Balkans and provides disproportionately great amount of political, economic and 
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cultural support to these communities and countries.97 The religious arguement is 
embedded in the discourse since the Bosnian War, when Turkey has provided help 
and assistance to Bosniaks who encountered with the aggressive behaviour and later 
with the physical attacks of the central Yugoslav government and Bosnian Serbs. 
 
The second part of the criticism is that Turkey pursues with an aggressive Ottoman 
imperialism to the region98 and has aspirations to expand its sphere of influence into 
the Balkans. All those Turkish diplomatic, political, economic and cultural involvement 
in the region serve this aim to get more influence and control the situation in the 
Balkans according to Turkey’s interests. These criticisms many times cite 
Davutoglu’s (in)famous 2009 presentation in Bosnia, where he stated sentences like 
“Sarajevo is ours”.99 Another aspect of this criticism is that it does not portray the 
Ottoman past as a prosperous and peaceful period, but as a time when the Balkan 
states’ development was disrupted and the Ottoman period was a time of decline. 
The national awakenings and revolutions against the Ottoman rule were just natural 
processes in which Balkan countries liberated themselves from occupation. 
 
There is also another part of the criticism, which is more concerned with Turkey’s 
intervention into some countries’ domestic affairs, primarily in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. When Turkey officially states that it supports the territorial integrity of 
Bosnia and it would not let the country fall apart, Serb critiques say that Turkey only 
wants to shape a united Bosnia according to its taste.100 Bosnian Serbs would like to 
explore all possibilities provided by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s federative state 
system and according to them Turkish statements like this are questioning this 
federative political structure. Milorad Dodik, President of the Serb entity of Bosnia, 
Republika Srpska, views this issue as a major problem. 
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1.3.3 Analysis of criticisms 
 
My duty here is not to judge these criticisms, just to provide an analysis of the – 
sometimes black and white – opinions, from my perspective. 
 
First of all, Ottoman multiculturalism is a really debated topic, as we have seen 
some politicians on both sides have adjusted this concept according to their short-
term policy aims. There is hardly any non-biased approach toward the Ottoman past 
and Turkey’s recent involvement in the Balkans, we should be really careful when we 
would like to assess this issue. 
Referring to the first section of the criticism, it is true that Ottomanism was not a 
foreign policy and aimed at creating a common Ottoman atmosphere, but we should 
mention that this was because at that time those territories were inside the Ottoman 
Empire, no foreign policy was needed to be formulated to those entities. In addition, 
the Ottoman history and traditions are mushrooming in today’s Turkish foreign policy 
toward these regions and there is a huge focus on common similarities, where co-
operation could be established. 
The opinion, regarding that Turkey does not have enough political and economic 
capabilities to pursue such a policy in the Balkans, is debatable. Turkey is the 17th 
biggest economy in the world,101 the Turkish economy is booming, with economic 
growth coming right after China. Although, Turkey is still a country which requires and 
depends on significant amount of FDI 102  but the robustly strenghtening Turkish 
economy and companies also bring their “side effects”: a more confident, diverse and 
assertive foreign policy. Part of the opinion might be true. However, Turkey might be 
on the edge of becoming a power like this, more than half of the total Turkish 
investment in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo has been realised since 
2005.103 In addition, Turkey has also realised that there was a vacuum to step in with 
a mediating role, albeit, without international support the effects of this role might 
diminish soon. Nevertheless, this role is more than what the EU and the US did in the 
last years, regarding the involvement in trying to settle disagreements between 
Bosnia and Serbia, or Serbia and Kosovo for example. 
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The statement that neo-Ottomanism has embraced Western values and it does not 
confront the Western world is more than ambigious. The Turkish government is trying 
to prove and voice that Western values – like democracy or human rights – are part 
of their policies, were always part actually, and there is nothing that the West needs 
to worry about. The disturbing factor here is that the current Turkish foreign policy 
approach is rather pragmatic and also embraces other values, including Eastern and 
Islam ones too. The mixture of these in the current Turkish foreign policy, including 
neo-Ottomanism, currently seems to be uninterpretable in the Western political axis, 
the problems in connection with Turkey’s policies arise according to this. 
Reflecting to the sentence that Turkey acts as a balancing power in the region 
might be a bit exaggerated. Turkey’s support and mediating role should not be 
undervalued, however, the region’s aim is primarily Euro-Atlantic integration. The EU 
and the US are also present with diplomatic, economic and military means to provide 
peace, security, stability and development in the region, therefore Turkey alone does 
not play a balancing role, perhaps just contributes to it. 
Religion, officially, does not play a role in Turkey’s relations with countries in the 
region. However, Turkey showed great sympathy and help toward the Bosniaks and 
Kosovars during the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts – albeit more originated with the 
human rights and humanitarian part of the crises – and this made a mark in many 
people, mainly Serbs in the Balkans that Turkey might be biased when establishing 
relations and co-operating with Muslim communities in the region. In addition, we 
should also take into consideration that if you face a smaller reacting force, even 
friendly approximation, you would co-operate with that person at first, not the most 
opponent one. Therefore, criticisms directed to the religious bias of the Turkish 
government’s policies might be baseless, although, Turkish communities and 
organisations heavily invested in promoting Turkish education, culture in Bosnia and 
several remarks of Bosniak intellectuals could have contributed to fueling this 
debate.104 However, Islam in the Balkans is considered to be more liberal (e.g. in 
Kosovo)105 than to the east, so it occupies less role in politics106 and this could also 
provide an example that religion could not be a major part of Turkey’s foreign policy 
toward the region. 
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Regarding the criticism directed to the possible post-Ottoman imperial aspirations, it 
is quite doubtful that Turkey has a clearly defined imperial policy and aggressively 
tries to pursue its aims in the region. This issue is a great possibility to fuel 
nationalism, a card used by local politicians a lot, and to exploit several communities’ 
populist “hunger”. Turkey alone, even if it would like to be, can not be a dominant 
political, economic and military player in the region, the EU and the US also have a 
major say in the flow of things in the area and most Balkan countries’ aim is the Euro-
Atlantic integration – not a union with Turkey, which also aims at EU accession. 
The other part of the criticism, which refers to the Ottoman past as a period when 
the development of the Balkan states were disrupted, has some points worth to 
consider. Western and Eastern Christianity were dominant in the region before the 
arrival of the Ottomans, the countries in the region belonged to the sphere of 
influence of one or the other and their economic development also followed this line. 
The Ottoman conquest of the Balkans did not happen at once, decades passed by 
until the Empire managed to secure control over several territories and in many 
occasions opponent local noblemen called in the Turks, to provide help to them. In 
addition, the Ottoman centuries of the Balkans should not be observed as just one 
point, the time of conquest, but in a wider picture and should be assessed according 
to this. Albanians for example have just started to reevaluate how the Ottoman 
centuries are portrayed in their history books.107 This also points to the matter that 
politics in the Balkans have penetrated the field of the perception of history and the 
reassessment, reconsideration of one-sided opinions have just started. 
 
The last part of the criticisms, which is concerned with Turkey’s intervention into 
Balkan states’, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina’s, internal affairs is again an 
example of how the different sides perceive and portray Turkish activity in the region. 
Those who would like to see further co-operation with Turkey do not see Turkish 
statements on territorial integrity, stability etc. as intervening into internal affairs, while 
others see this as a threat to their independence and autonomous functioning. We 
could say that the more a situation is unstable (even for the politician him/herself) – 
or just divert or downplay the importance of other issues – the more this tool is used 
to provide somewhat an answer for the crowds who eagerly wait for an adequate 
response. 
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2. The Ottoman past in the Balkans and Turkey’s foreign policy 
toward the region in the 20th century 
 
“The Ottoman past remains one of the most controversial historical subjects across 
much of the Balkans”. 108  This issue got particularly into the focus amidst rising 
nationalism and violent state-building processes after the 1980s and the topic still 
spurs debate since then. In the following chapter I will present and analyse briefly the 
approximately five century long Ottoman rule of the Balkans and then the Turkish 
foreign policy’s approaches to the region – to put the subject into a wider context – 
and break down the characteristics and important factors of this period in those three 
countries, on which I have special focus. 
 
 
2.1 Overview of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans in this period 
2.1.1 The Ottomans 
 
The Ottomans, established themselves as an empire with the leadership of Osman 
bey in northwestern Anatolia in 1299, have started to appear and conquer much of 
the Balkans in the 14th century, after Gallipoli became their first permanent base in 
Europe in 1354.109 After the capture of Edirne and Thessaloniki, Sultan Murad rapidly 
advanced towards the Macedonian and Greek lands and then to Albania, Bulgaria 
and Serbia, significantly weakening the Hungarian influence in the Balkans. By 1388, 
Ottoman forces even reached the southern edge of Bosnia. The Battle of Kosovo 
(1389) is considered as a decisive point of Balkan and Serbian history: nonetheless 
the battle was seen as a draw, the high number of Serbian casualties deprived them 
the possibility of strong further resistance and in a few years time most Serbian 
noblemen became vassals of the Sultan. In addition, the road to the northern Balkans 
and Hungary opened up in front of the Ottoman conquest. 
 
From this point the Balkans eventually became a constant battlefield for more than 
150 years. With some interruptions in the process – the Interregnum and Venetian re-
conquests for example – consequent Sultans captured all important territories in the 
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Balkans, including Constantinople in 1453 110  – putting a definitive end to the 
existence of the Byzantine Empire. During the last years of the 15th and the first years 
and decades of the 16th century, the Ottomans conquered the remaining parts of the 
Peloponnese, Montenegro was invaded too and with Suleyman the Magnificent at 
the helm, all Serbia and Bosnia were successfully gained and incorporated into the 
Ottoman Empire. Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia became Ottoman tributary 
entities for good and all in this period. 
 
In the years between the death of Suleiman (1566) and the second battle of Vienna 
(1683), borders on the west stiffened and the Ottoman rule in the Balkans got 
stabilised. Bosnia for example remained in the hands of the Ottomans until the late 
19th century and Serbia only gained complete statehood in 1882. With the stagnation 
period of the Ottoman Empire starting in the 16th and soon after that with its decline 
getting visible in the 17th century, some territories and the influence in the Balkans 
was gathered by the Habsburgs (and Russia, under the Orthodox flag). 111  The 
reasons for the weakening were diverse and multifold: administrative, economic 
difficulties coupled with the inability of the Ottoman army to develop onto the same 
level as those of the European powers. Ottoman Hungary and northern Bosnia was 
already lost by that time, and with the national awakenings, brought in by the ideas of 
the French Revolution at the beginning of the 19th century in Serbia, Greece, 
Romania and Bulgaria, and later in Albania, the Ottomans’ attempts to reform the 
Empire  –  to provide a more flexible, autonumous and overarching approach to keep 
the Empire in one – completely failed. The disintegrating Empire, due to the 
appearance of independent states, lost almost all of its European territories 
completely by 1912. The new independent Balkan countries exploited the weak state 
of the Ottoman Empire and staged a war against the Ottomans (First Balkan War, 
1912), with major territorial gains, only eastern Thrace remained under Ottoman rule, 
however, the Ottoman Empire did not give up and gathered some areas back – from 
Bulgaria – in the Second Balkan War in 1913.112  
 
                                                 
110 Goffman, Daniel. The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. 2nd. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004: 54. 
111 Hanioglu, M. Sükrü. A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008: 110-111. 
112 Hanioglu, M. Sükrü. A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008: 157 & 172. 
 28
The Ottoman rule in the Balkans had significant effects on the societies residing in 
these territories. The following points can be deducted from a closer analysis:113 
 
• the Ottoman conquest disrupted the historical development of the Balkans, 
• the Ottomans did not assimilate the people living in the region, but added 
new elements and revived previous traditions, 
• mass immigration of Turkomans into the Balkans from the east,114 
• the Muslim religion and Ottoman feudalism became the fundamental 
cementing elements of the society with differentiating between non-Muslims 
and Muslims, providing advantages for Muslims and smaller burdens on 
them, 
• the non-Muslims were never able to mix freely with Muslims, the Ottomans 
regulated the dress Christians needed to wear, Islam religion was put 
forward in all spheres of social life, 
• the Ottomans made agreements with the Orthodox Church – an “instrument 
of the Ottoman state”,115 the Empire tolerated the Church, until it served the 
Ottoman development and the Empire’s aims –, the Church was reorganised 
as a community under the control of the Patriarch who had extensive rights, 
Armenian and Jewish communities experienced the same treatment, 
• some Christians and people belonging to other religions – who were 
oppressed under Christian rule – converted to Islam to secure benefits of 
Muslim religion (and avoid drawbacks), but there was no pressure for mass 
conversion, but in Albania and Bosnia greater numbers chose to convert to 
Islam,116 
• the official language became Turkish, 
• the Empire isolated Christian communities from urban centers, destroyed 
states and the upper class of each respective country, 
• Balkan societies were bypassed by the Renaissance and Reformation, there 
was cultural stagnation, problems arose with possibilities to keep track on 
European developments and achievements through education, 
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• social life for Christians was cut back, regeneration of tribal life started to 
emerge, integration of cultures was not achieved, 
• Ottoman system fostered social and cultural differentiation, 
• Balkan peasants under Ottoman rule were less abused than in previous 
times, paid lower taxes – but Christian peasants paid higher ones than 
Muslims – and due to the centralised nature of the Empire they had greater 
security, 
• the Ottomans repopulated old cities and built new ones in the Balkans, 
• after the 18th century: de-Turkification, influx of Christian peasants to cities in 
the Balkans and Muslims migrating back to Anatolia, 
• Ottoman influence on dress, crafts, arts, cuisine, language, celebrations, 
religion, 
• Balkan Muslims incorporated many Christian practises and beliefs. 
 
The Ottoman Empire laid down its footprints heavily in the Balkans, however, the 
new elites in the newly established states immediately started to “reconquer” those 
fields, which the Ottomans deprived from them. 
 
2.1.2 The new Republic of Turkey 
 
After World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, where the still Ottoman 
Empire named entity suffered major losses in fights with the Allies – consisting of 
mainly British and Greek forces – but later regained some territories (Treaty of 
Lausanne), the Republic of Turkey was created and the new state – under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – committed itself to reforms, secularism and 
Westernisation, which also affected the field of foreign policy. This foreign policy, 
“peace at home, peace in the world”,117118 needed to be adapted to the Balkans – a 
new sphere of foreign, and not domestic, policy – too. The new, cautious and 
conservative Turkish foreign policy in the 1920s concentrated on to normalise the 
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relations with the countries in the Balkans119 and later to try to keep Germany and 
Italy out of the region. All ambassadors, who were sent to the key countries in the 
Balkans, were close friends of Atatürk and they have stayed in their positions for long 
years. Turkey maintained a close relationship with the Soviet Union, which has 
started during the process of Turkish independence, and the new Republic thought to 
get the support of the USSR for several of its policies. 
Turkey and Greece also tried to settle on the exchange of populations, property 
rights and the position of the Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul. Hundreds of thousands 
of Greeks and Turks needed to relocate, after the Greek defeats in western Anatolia 
approximately 1,3 million Greeks left for Greece and more than five hundred 
thousand Turks120 have already arrived to the territory of Turkey from the Balkans in 
the period 1912-1920, and these population movements changed the social 
landscape in both countries, but especially in Greece. The rapprochement in bilateral 
relations with Greece – Eleftherios Venizelos Greek and Ismet Inönü Turkish PM 
both wanted to normalise the hampered relations between the countries – ended in a 
treaty of friendship in 1930.121 
The normalisation of these relations made way for a Balkans wide co-operation. 
The first conference was held in October 1930, with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey as participating states where economic and cultural 
issues were discussed and the representatives agreed on the establishment of a 
permanent organisation.122 The second conference followed next year, more focused 
on the issue of minorities which was left out from the first meeting, failed to culminate 
in a draft of a Balkan Pact, mainly because of the disagreements over minority and 
territorial issues, Albania and Bulgaria voiced concerns respectively. However, there 
were several other forms of co-operation established in this period, such as the 
Balkan Tourist Federation or the Balkan Chamber of Agriculture.123  On the third 
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conference in 1932, the Bulgarian delegation left the meeting due to the rejection of 
its plans to include the topic of minorities in the agenda. 
With Italy’s more aggressive actions in the Mediterranean, Turkey was pushed 
towards a closer cooperation with the region and the country signed an Entente 
Cordiale with Greece in 1933. The agreement committed the two countries to defend 
common interests and to secure common representation. Nonagression, friendship 
and peace agreements were signed with Romania and Yugoslavia too. Bulgaria’s 
revisionist policies were a driving factor behind these agreements and particularly 
Yugoslavia was worried of Italy’s Albanian expansion. 
The fourth Balkan Conference (1933) 124  aimed at deepening the co-operation 
between the Balkan states and further steps were made to enhance this, including an 
aspiration towards the creation of a Balkan Pact. 
The deepening co-operation resulted in the creation of the Balkan Entente, signed 
by representatives of Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey in 1934. 125  The 
participating states agreed to guarantee the security of the existing borders in the 
Balkans and consult fellow members before taking political action against another 
Balkan state. The reasons for the creation of the entente were multifold. Bulgaria’s 
revisionist approaches were widely considered as a motivating factor behind the 
agreement and also the great powers’ – mainly Italy’s – possible intervention in the 
Balkans were not neglected either. However, Greece attached special provisions to 
its version due to fears of provoking Italy with the agreement. In addition, the Hellenic 
state also initiated another provision, which included that the protection of 
Yugoslavia’s borders would not involve Greece and it was not obligatory for any of 
the members to help the other in case of an Italian attack. 
The Pact never achieved to fulfill its role: it was considered as a limited and weak 
treaty.126 The agreement aimed at maintaining the status quo on the peninsula, a 
common defence dimension was completely missing and members had different 
policy considerations which they did not manage to fit into the common targets. 
Turkey’s close connections with the USSR also popped up the need for special 
clauses in the agreement: the security guaranties were only valid between Balkan 
states, so a Romanian-Soviet dispute could not involve the Balkan Entente. 
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Compared to other states in the region, Turkey had the greatest potential to 
become a middle power in the interwar era, mainly due to diplomatic factors.127 With 
an experienced Ottoman diplomatic heritage, no imperialist aspirations, being a 
bridge between two continents, controlling the only seaway between the Black Sea 
and the Aegean and believing that the country’s geostrategic importance is still valid, 
Turkey was soon seen as a partner – rather than a threat. A political vacuum in the 
Balkans, no great power was particularly and directly involved here at the beginning 
of this period, also helped Turkey to facilitate co-operation. The new Republic also 
embraced the equality among states – meanwhile the country was accepted as a 
member state into the League of Nations in 1932 – and started to become a leading 
power in the region. Members of the entente welcomed and supported Turkish 
initiatives and believed that the country had turned its back on the Ottoman heritage. 
Turkish policies were perceived as promoting the Balkans’ interests on the regional 
and European level too. Turkey also managed to secure the abolishment of the 
international control and demilitarisation of the Turkish Straits at a conference in 
Montreux in 1936. From this time Turkey was the sole power to monitor and control 
the straits and the country was fully authorised to station troops in the area. 
 
However, with the deteriorating European situation – Germany’s and Italy’s (and 
party the USSR’s) attention started to turn more and more toward southeastern 
Europe – countries of the Balkans made bilateral agreements to guarantee their own 
security.128 Yugoslavia and Romania tried to manoeuvre to avoid any further German, 
Italian and Soviet threats, Bulgarian revisionism was not taken as primary issue then. 
The Balkan Entente although came to an inevitable end with the break out of Word 
War II, the USSR took Bessarabia and Bukovina from Romania, Italy attacked 
Greece and German troops invaded Yugoslavia. The majority of the countries which 
formed the entente were occupied by foreign forces or coerced into hurtful 
agreements. 
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2.1.3 World War II. 
 
The developments in Europe from 1933 – when Adolf Hitler came to power in 
Germany and Italy aspired to become a Mediterranean and African great power – 
made Turkey to consider more factors in its foreign policy. Italy’s presence in the 
Aegean, in the Dodecanese Islands, Germany’s economic and political pressure in 
the Balkans and the German annexation of Austria in 1938 and Czechoslovakia in 
1939, and Italy’s annexation of Albania in 1939 made Turkey to stand firm against 
German and Italian expansionist plans. The country’s government decided to deepen 
relations and sign mutual aid and assistance agreements with the United Kingdom 
and France to prevent further Axis power gains.  
The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 caused great surprise and disturbance in 
Turkey, which the Soviet Union helped much to establish its independent statehood, 
and suspicions got strengthened that German and Soviet involvement in the Balkans 
– and in the Middle East and the Caucasus – might get accelerated. Turkish foreign 
policy tried to secure guarantees in Moscow that the USSR would not interfere more 
in the region, but received no positive reply. Turkey strengthened its co-operation 
with Britain and France by signing a Mutual Assistance Treaty in October 1939,129 in 
which the two great powers promised help for Turkey if it is going to be attacked and 
Turkey also promised help for Britain and France if German or Italian troops enter 
British and French territories in the Mediterranean. 
Italy attacked Greece in October 1940 and this forced Turkey to declare strict 
measures and deploy its troops into eastern Thrace in order to prevent any possible 
Italian incursions.130 Several of the articles of the Mutual Assistance Treaty should 
have come into force with the Italian invasion of Greek but Turkey did not want to go 
to war because of fears that in that case the country would face a bigger threat – the 
Soviet Union. With the fall of France in 1940, German entry into Bulgaria in 1941 and 
into Greece and Yugoslavia in the same year, the Turkish government reconsidered 
its agreements with Britain and France and claimed that the Mutual Assistance 
Treaty was no longer valid due to France’s drop-out from it and signed a 
nonagression pact with Germany in June 1941. This agreement basically paved out 
the way for Turkish neutrality in World War II: from this point Turkey refused to enter 
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the war on grounds that it was not adequately armed to counter a German 
aggression but as the German positions in the Balkans started to weaken, Turkey 
broke off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944 and 
declared war on the country in February 1945. 
 
2.1.4 The Cold War 
 
As the war nearly came to an end on the continent, the division of the Balkans has 
been already started between the USSR and Britain. It was decided that Albania and 
Bulgarian would fall into the Soviet sphere of influence, whereas Britain could 
determine policies in Greece. Influence in Yugoslavia was sought to be divided 
equally between the two powers. However, the Soviet Union helped communist 
parties to take over governments in Albania and Yugoslavia too, and supported 
Greek communists in that country’s civil war after World War II with the aim of 
establishing a communist Greece. Britain was no longer able to support Greece to 
fight with the communists and the US needed to step in to provide military and 
political aid and assistance to tackle this problem. With communists on the edge of 
encircling Turkey, the Turkish government tried to make steps to avoid this situation, 
but Britain was not in a position to afford any help to Turkey either and President 
Truman, in line with the Truman Doctrine, promised US resources, economic aid and 
military capabilities for Greece and Turkey. This act proved to be of great significance, 
Turkey’s integration into Western organisations has started immediately, to contain 
the Soviet Union. Turkey became member of the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) by 1948, a member of the Council of Europe in 1949 
and member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – together with 
Greece – in 1952. By 1954, as Cold War structures stabilised, the international 
political situation has also considerably firmed in the region, 131  with socialist 
Yugoslavia staying outside of the Soviet bloc and communist rule completely 
strengthening in Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. 
 
The East-West – economic, political and military – division of the Balkans from the 
1950s reduced the role of the peninsula in regional and international politics132 and 
with Turkey orientating toward the West the “intermediate countries” were ignored 
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and observed with indifference by the Turkish government. 133  Yugoslavia, as a 
country expelled from the Soviet bloc, searched for connection points in the region 
and this resulted in a friendship and co-operation treaty with Greece and Turkey in 
1954, but this agreement proved to be shortlived due to Khruschev’s rapprochement 
to Tito and Yugoslavia’s commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement. The treaty fell 
into complete languidity by 1960, although it was concluded for twenty years. 
 
There were several attempts to facilitate co-operation in the frozen relations in the 
Balkans between the two blocks in this period, however no major attempt resulted in 
real breakthrough. The Turkish government observed all Romanian and Bulgarian 
shots with suspicion to develop bilateral relations because it thought the Soviets tried 
to divide the Western alliance through their satellite states and secondly, because 
Bulgaria’s treatment of its numerous Turkish minority. Bulgaria even forced 150 
thousand of its Turkish citizens to emigrate to neighbouring Turkey and this act 
severely worsened relations between the two states for several years.134 The Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the Cyprus issue and the Johnson letter all had considerable effect on 
this time’s Turkey’s Balkans directed foreign policy but the aim of the thesis is not to 
go in deep of these themes, for further information there are several academic 
literature available.135 
Relations with Yugoslavia on the other hand developed in a more friendlier manner 
at this time.136 Tito’s split with the Soviet Union, the Turkish minorities’ treatment and 
the Yugoslav stance on the Cyprus issue were no problematic points in the 
developing relations. Albanian-Turkish relations, despite the two countries being in 
the opposite blocs, also developed in this period, cultural and trade agreements were 
concluded. 
 
Due to the deteriorating situation in Cyprus and Turkey’s armed involvement in the 
crisis – a military junta rose to power in Greece with revisionist aspirations toward 
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Cyprus – on the Mediterranean island in 1974, the US suspended all military aid to 
Turkey and this had major consequences in Turkish foreign policy. With worse 
relations with Greece and shoving off from the US, Turkey groped into other 
directions in the Balkans, namely establishing better relations with Romania, Bulgaria 
and strengthening the existing ties with Yugoslavia. At the end of the 1970s, Turkish 
politicians made high level visits to Bucharest, Sofia and Belgrade. 
 
The 1980s brought change in these policies, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 put the whole situation into another context. Turkey 
started to realign to the West, but several problems remained, mainly with Greece. 
The issues which were highly debated between the two sides included the still 
unresolved situation in Cyprus, territorial disputes in the Aegean, the boundaries of 
the continental shelf and the Greece’s treatment of western Thrace’s Turkish 
minority.137 Another major problem was the Turkish minority’s treatment in Bulgaria, 
where the government took on a path to forced assimilation from the mid-1980s and 
Turkey first did not realise the seriousness of this issue – relations seemed normal 
with Bulgarian politicians, there were regular visits – and after the 1980 coup the 
Turkish government, responding to Western criticisms, aimed at improving relations 
with eastern European countries. However, the situation worsened rapidly and 
Turkey had no other choice to open its borders in front of the mass exodus of Turkish 
emigrants departing from Bulgarian. Until the end of 1989 more than 300 thousand 
Turks left from Bulgaria to avoid Todor Zhivkov’s suppressing rule. 
 
Real breakthrough in Turkey’s relations with Balkan countries did not come until the 
end of the 1980s, the Cold War dominated international arena did not provide the 
adequate conditions for Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy in the region. The 
Turkish government aimed at maintaining the status quo and did not challenge the 
main pillars of the region’s relations, co-operation was limited and trust in the 
sincereness of other countries’ foreign policies was not on a high level.  
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2.1.5 Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s 
 
The last decade of the century started in a global turmoil and change. With the Iron 
Curtain coming down, the dissolution of the USSR – the escalating conflict between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan –, the Cold War came to an end, the first Gulf War and the 
rising tensions in Yugoslavia provided new challenges for Turkish foreign policy. 
Turkey needed to change fundamentally, reevaluate several priorities and possible 
threats.138 Turgut Özal has already started to diversify the curve of the country’s 
foreign policy and in line with this Turkish intellectuals have also started a dialogue 
about the state’s Ottoman past, as all was mentioned in the first chapter, however the 
general assumptions and directions of Turkish foreign policy did not change much 
until the escalation of the Balkan, and especially the Bosnian crisis. 
In the following sub-chapters I will present, analyse and assess the three countries’ 
Ottoman past and relations with Turkey, concentrating on the events in the 1990s, 
including the Bosnian war and Kosovo conflict 
 
 
2.2 Albania 
 
Independent Albania existed only in temporary periods throughout the Middle Ages, 
Albanian territories were largely under a dominant power’s supervision first under 
Byzantine, then Bulgarian, Serbian rule and finally the Ottomans conquered the 
Albanian lands.  
The roots of the Ottoman past in Albania date back until the 14th century when 
Sultan Murat’s Ottoman raiders first reached Albania.139 The Ottomans were called in 
by one of the local tribal leaders to support his fight against another local notable. 
The territory of Albania was divided at that time among local notables and the 
Venetians, the majority of the population was Orthodox (in the south) due to the 
previous Byzantine and Bulgarian legacy, however, Roman Catholic groups (in the 
north) were also to be found in the area. Migration of Albanian people has already 
started in this period, this factor later becomes an important issue, mainly due the 
scarcity of land, cattle, deriving from the territory’s mountainous landscape, and 
interestingly, blood feud. 
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By reason of the divided state of the Albanians, they were not able to resist the 
Ottoman pressure and in a couple of years time the major Albanian feudal lords 
became vassals of the Sultan. The Battle of Kosovo in 1389, in which several 
Albanian princes took part, also proved to be of a great power loss for the Albanians, 
although, the Ottoman Interregnum (1402-1413) provided a little relief, Ottoman 
expansionism slowed down.140 Nonetheless, the Ottoman conquest of Albania was 
interrupted just for a short period of time, southern Albania fell into the hand of Sultan 
Mehmed and the northern territories became tributaries of the Empire. By the mid 
15th century, all Albanian lands were under Ottoman rule. On the other hand, an 
Albanian resistance movement started to emerge in this period, with the leadership of 
George Kastrioti, later knows as Skanderbeg, a son of an Albanian nobleman who 
was sent to Istanbul to military training.141  He converted to Islam and after some 
military expeditions in other parts of the Empire, he returned back to Albania to 
administer the region, however after arriving to the Albanian lands he turned against 
the Ottomans, reconverted to Roman Catholicisim and organised an uprising which 
lasted almost all the remaining part of the century, until his death. Regarding 
Albanian identity, Skanderbeg and his movement, had (has) significant meanings: 
the rebellious nature of Albanians and desire for freedom derive from this time. 
The Venetians left Albanian territories in 1501 and by this time the Ottomans 
completely conquered these areas, a huge wave of Albanian emigration has landed 
in surrounding regions, mainly Italy. 
The following decades were the time when Anatolian immigrants have started to 
arrive in Albania, the Ottoman Empire established its feudal and administration 
system on this territory too and new cities, with Muslim majorities, mushroomed in the 
area. Albanian communities have largely preserved their religion, Roman Catholic 
and Orthodox, conversion to Islam was not significant during these years. 
In 1596, for the persuasion of European powers, a couple of thousand Albanians 
revolted against the Ottomans, however, without outer support, their resistance did 
not last for so long. 
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Due to the conversion of the local population by the time of the 17th century, almost 
30 percent of the population became Muslim142 and this trend moved forward in the 
upcoming decades. On the other hand, the majority of Albanians were not devoted 
Muslims, Catholic and Orthodox traditions were still deeply rooted in the society and 
on many festive occasions the three religious groups celebrated together. The 
Islamisation of the local aristocracy, to incorporate them into the Ottoman 
administration was the most persuasive power the Ottomans could use, forced 
convertions in most of the cases failed in Albania. By the 16th century, Christian and 
Orthodox influence started to decline, mainly because they were forced to give up 
their profitable activities in the cities. The spread of Islam happened voluntarily, in the 
17th and 18th century there was a sharp increase in the Muslim population of Albania, 
especially in the rural population. People wanted to survive, embed themselves into 
the Ottoman hierarchy. However, a relatively big number of Albanians exercised 
Roman Catholicism and Orthodox religion, by the end of the 19th century 30 percent 
of the population was not Muslim. 
The Albanian lands in the 17th-18th century, with the Ottoman central power 
weakening, fell into the hands of local clans who usually used the help of the Sultan 
to suppress their opponents. The clans established a relatively wide autonomy for 
their lands, helped the Empire in several military campaigns, however, the Ottomans 
did not watch this existence positively and crushed this independent movement in 
1830 by massacring hundreds of Albanian leaders. The rule of the local pashas 
ended, but several uprisings occurred in the upcoming decades, all of them failed. 
These were answers for the tanzimat, a movement to modernise the Empire and 
preserve its territorial integrity by promoting Ottomanism, and created a greater union 
and identity in the homogenous society of Albania. 
The Albanian national awakening and nationalism, due to the lack of a previously 
existing state and a homogenous religion, developed at a slower pace than in the 
surrounding nations. However, the events accelerated in the 1870s, with Albanian 
leaders establishing the League of Prizren (in Kosovo),143 to gain more autonomy 
from the Ottomans, to unite Albanian political power and to protest against the 
verdicts of the Treaty of San Stefano, which took away Albanian inhabited lands from 
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that time’s Albania.144  The League staged an uprising at the end of the decade, but 
the Ottomans crushed the uprising again. Albanian-language schools were banned, 
the local population was oppressed. Nonetheless, the existence of a strong political 
and military entity strengthened the Albanians’ need for unification and their own 
country.  
The Young Turk movement, emerged as an opposition of the Sultan in the 
beginning of the 20th century, wanted to reform the Empire and restore the 
constitutional government. At first, Albanians joined the movement, it seemed that the 
Young Turks would allow Albanian education and writing, but the movement did not 
aim to acknowledge the rights of the nationalities of the Empire, Ottomanism was the 
ruling idea. Albanian resistance started almost immediately from this point, the armed 
struggle ended in the capture of the capital of the Kosovo vilayet, Skopje, in 1912. 
The Ottomans agreed to fulfill the Albanians’ demands and the territory of today’s 
Albania was recognised as independent state by the Great Powers in 1913. However, 
territorial disputes have remained, particularly with Serbia over the area of Kosovo. 
With the domestic and international turmoil in the following years, diplomatic 
relations between independent Albania and Turkey were not established until the 
latter gained independence in 1923. In that time, an eternal friendship agreement 
was made between the two governments.145 At the same time Albania could be 
hardly called as a fully functioning state in this period, only under King Zogu (1928-
1939) the conditions picked up. 
In the interwar era the bilateral relations concentrated mainly on the establishment 
of relations and the involvement of Albania into forms of regional cooperation. 
However, Albania after a time became detached from these Turkish approaches as it 
was drawn more and more into an Italian sphere of influence, finally annexed by Italy 
in 1939, and could not pursue a fully independent foreign policy. 
During World War II, Albania was occupied by Italian, Nazi German forces and 
several Albanian inhabited neighbouring areas were attached to Albania, including 
Kosovo, parts of the Kingdom and Yugoslavia and northern Epirus.  
After the war, with the communist Enver Hoxha getting into power in Albania in 
1946, relations with any foreign country deteriorated and got severe, Turkey was no 
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exception.146 As Turkey got engaged actively in the Western bloc and its policies and 
Albania found itself in the other camp, almost all connections were lost. Economic 
and diplomatic co-operation were minimised. However, with Albania’s vote in the UN 
for Turkey regarding the Cyprus question in 1965, relations started to get better, 
political visits happened and trade agreements were signed in this decade. 
Nevertheless, with Hoxha putting Albania into complete isolation for a decade until 
his death in 1985, no major breakthrough was achieved in the bilateral relations. This 
breakthrough was achieved in 1988, when the Turkish FM, Mesut Yilmaz visited 
Tirana and stated that there were no political problems between the two states, he 
spoke of the Albanian FM, Reiz Malile as “my friend” and hoped to establish even 
better bilateral relations.147 In 1990, Tirana hosted the first high level multilateral 
meeting since 1945, however, Turkey was not present due to Greek concerns about 
the country’s Balkans oriented foreign policy. On the other hand, Albanian-Turkish 
bilateral relations were improving, the Albanian FM also paid a visit to Turkey in 1990 
and several agreements were signed during his trip. 
The transformation was going quite slowly in Albania, all communist eastern 
European countries held democratic elections by 1990, but in Albania the first 
democratic elections were organised only in 1991 amidst a domestic chaos and 
rumours that the post-communist Labour Party, led by Hoxha’s hand-picked 
successor – Ramiz Alia –, used state institutions to persuade voters. Alia was not 
able to establish order, stable democracy and economic situation and in 1992 the 
Sali Berisha led anti-communist Democratic Party (DP) rose to power in the elections. 
The new government’s foreign policy aim was to reach approximation with the EC 
and to embed Albania into Western institutions. Albania was already a member of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) since 1991 and became member of OIC in 1992, emphasising 
the country’s Islam religion and Islamic traditions. The DP and Berisha immediately 
started to open up Albania to the world and normalise, develop relations with foreign 
countries. From 1992, the relations improved on all major grounds. Turkey promised 
millions of dollars of assistance and aid to Albania, President Özal visited Albania in 
1993 and on the Turkish PM’s, Suleyman Demiral’s visit to Tirana the two countries 
signed a friendship and cooperation agreement. Berisha, at that time President of 
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Albania, also facilitated the expansion of Turkish assistance into several sectors of 
the economy and on his trip to Turkey in 1993 he invited Turkish investors to Albania. 
Berisha was even called a “Turkey-fan” by his opponents, pointing to the matter that 
he was really eager to develop relations between the two countries. 
Albanian politicians also sought to gain the support of Turkey for Albania’s NATO 
membership and to peacefully settle the situation of Kosovar Albanians. Turkey also 
facilitated an infrastructural co-operation between the two countries, involving 
neighbouring states too, to create an East-West Motorway Project, linking Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania and an agreement between the countries was 
signed in 1995 to underline this.148 The millions of Albanian origin Turkish citizens 
were also playing a major factor in the developing bilateral relations. 
 
In the following couple of years the Albanian government was still not able to 
establish a functioning state administration, a relatively stable economy and military. 
From the mid 1990s due to the underdevelopment of the Albanian financial sector, 
the majority of the population invested in so-called pyramid schemes, which promised 
incredibly high profits. The whole system collapsed in January 1997, people lost 
more than 1,2 billion USD.149150 Riots broke out in the country, looters appeared on 
the streets and the military clashed with several armed groups – Albania fell into 
complete chaos, two thousand people died in the rebellion. The UN authorised a 
multinational force to secure the flow of humanitarian aid to the country and among 
other nations, Turkey also took part in the mission. Turkish nationals were evacuated 
from the country. The Turkish FM, Tansu Ciller stated that Turkey would provide any 
kind of help what Albania would need. 
The UN forces managed to restore order in the country and Berisha’s party was 
voted out from power in the 1997, to be replaced by the Socialist Party.  
The next years showed an increase in the pace of Albanian-Turkish relations, 
political, economic, cultural and military means of co-operation were further 
deepened. High level state visits have accelerated, particularly in connection to the 
Kosovo conflict, Turkey provided further 20 million USD credit to Albania in 2000 – 
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even in time of economic hardships151 – and rescheduled the payment of a previous 
loan, Turkish investors and companies started to appear in Albania and take part in 
the privatisation process, Turkish military officials actively contributed to the training 
of the Albanian military during the 1990s to prepare the country to meet NATO 
standards. Turkey tried to facilitate a dialogue prior to the Kosovo crisis between the 
two sides, as it was mentioned previously here, but no agreement was reached. 
Turkish officials paid visits to Albania before the war and sought to discuss issues 
with the Albanian government, instead of Kosovar Albanians, believing that Albania 
was the main leader and spokesman of the Albanians on the other side of the border. 
Turkish military units were also placed in Albanian bases during the Kosovo crisis. 
Economic co-operation became the main driving factor of the relations, this field 
witnessed remarkable growth especially after 2002 and because of the stable 
economic growth in both countries. 
 
 
2.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The Ottomans started to appear on the borders of Bosnia in the 14th century. 
Previously in the same century Bosnians managed to strengthen their already 
established independent statehood, while struggling between the Hungarians and 
Byzantium.152 However, after Bosnia’s charismatic leader’s, Ban Tvrtko’s death in 
1391, due the the dynastic fightings and feudal division, the territory started to 
disintegrate. First, Bosnia was able to resist the Ottoman pressure with Hungarian 
help, although the domestic problems in Hungary and Bosnia’s divided state gave the 
Ottomans a huge advantage and finally Bosnia fell under Ottoman rule in 1463. 
Nonetheless, resistance against the Ottomans continued through the century and the 
Empire was only able to fully incorporate the territory in 1527.153 
Bosnia’s fall resulted in a four hundred century long Ottoman rule in the territory. In 
the 16th and early 17th century the territory enjoyed relative prosperity, Bosnian 
soldiers and scholars made significant impression on the Empire’s military and 
cultural life. 
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The voluntary, and on some occasions forced, conversions to Islam – mainly 
because of political and economic advantages –, the immigration of Turks and the 
settlement of “trustworthy” Muslims into strategic, border areas resulted in that by the 
17th century 75 percent of the population of Bosnia became Muslim.154 The previously 
Orthodox and Roman Catholic Serbs and Croatians left the territory in great numbers, 
or also converted to Islam. On the other hand, due to the constant fightings and wars 
in the region, the Ottoman province of Bosnia economically declined, Muslim 
immigrants arrived from neighbouring war-torn areas and contributed to the emerging 
Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) population. 
With the Ottoman Empire losing grounds in the Balkans and both politically and 
militarily weakening, and with the European revolutionary ideas spreading, people in 
Bosnia also started to formulate ideas of freedom. 155  Bosnian aristocrats were 
worried of the Ottomans’ modernising efforts which have threatened their privileges. 
Several uprisings took place in the 19th century against the Ottomans, the Orthodox 
Church also saw an opportunity to strenghten its presence in Bosnia and to support 
independence movements. Many Muslims started to leave for Turkey to avoid the 
deteriorating situation. Nonetheless, the suppression of Christians in Bosnia reached 
a point when these people could not bear it: the Herzegovinian rebellion, mainly led 
by Christians in the territory, pushed out the Ottomans from Bosnia. However, the 
conflict flared, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia became also involved and at 
the Congress of Berlin Bosnia was ceded to Austria-Hungary in 1878. The Habsburg-
led monarchy exploited the ethnic and religious differences in the region and played 
the communities against in each other to strengthen the Austro-Hungarian rule over 
the area. These events also laid grounds for the roots of greater ethnic tensions later 
in the 20th century.156 
After World War I, Bosnia was incorporated into the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in 
line with the unifying southern Slav efforts. Turkish foreign policy from this period 
toward Bosnia ceased to exist until the early 1990s, because it was embedded in 
Turkish-Yugoslav relations, since Bosnia was part of Yugoslavia.  
In the interwar era Serb-Croat efforts were made to carve out partitioning lines 
between the ethnic communities. During World War II, Bosnia was ceded to the the 
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newly independent Croatia.157 Several atrocities were committed by Nazi supported 
Serbs against Muslim people residing in Bosnia. 
After World War II the territory of Bosnia, the member state of Bosnia had no titular 
nation to dominate its administration, 158  was incorporated back into the forming 
socialist Yugoslavia. Bosnia was basically untouched as a federal entity in this period, 
however, it experienced rapid economic growth – mainly because of military related 
industries and the exploitation of natural resources – and the Bosniaks were granted 
an ethnic minority and later a constituent ethnicity status in the 1960s and 1970s 
respectively, acknowledging their rights and importance within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 159  Nonetheless, with the emergence of economic problems in the 
1970s and 1980s, unemployment started to rise, mainly in Serb populated areas and 
several industries have started to decline. Prominent Serb intellectuals published a 
Memorandum in 1986, claiming that Serbs have been suppressed by Albanians and 
Croats who also committed genocide against them.160 As the nationalist Slobodan 
Milosevic rose into power in Serbia, he openly challenged the Yugoslav entity and 
promoted the creation of Greater Serbia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina too. In 
1990 there were multiparty elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Slovenia and anti-communist political forces came to power. Slovenia and Croatia 
tried to carve out a diplomatic solution in the disintegrating situation with Serbia, 
however, Serbia did not prove to be helpful and understanding. The two countries 
declared their independence in June 1991 and this triggered immediate conflict with 
Serbia. The war in Slovenia did not last for long, the European Communities’ 
intervention ended the conflict. On the other hand, with greater amount of Serbian 
population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Krajina Serbs announcing 
the creation of a greater Serbian community with Bosanska Krajina, the armed 
conflict soon overspilled into these areas and by 1992 there were already thousands 
of dead and more than two million refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia’s 
ethnically most mixed territory.161 
 
The Turkish public was in favour of Muslims in the Balkans, against the Serbs, but 
in 1991 it seemed that the West – the US and Europe – wanted to preserve the 
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status quo and keep Yugoslavia in one.162 Turkey’s non-interference policy did not 
change even after Slovenia left the Yugoslav federation and war broke out between 
Croatian and Serbian forces because of Croatia’s secession attempt. Turkey 
declared that the Yugoslav army was responsible for keeping order and dealing with 
the civil war situation in the federal entities. The reasons for Turkey’s stance were 
manifold: the Turkish government maintained friendly relations with Yugoslavia 
throughout the 1980s, the Yugoslav government supported Turkey against Bulgaria’s 
policies dealing with the country’s Turkish minority, Turkey was afraid of the possible 
waves of Bosnian and Albanian immigrants and the Turkish government wanted to 
avoid to be seen as a “neo-Ottomanist” power in the region, which has aspirations for 
sphere of influence establishing. However, as the West’s position started to change 
regarding the escalating situation, so did Turkey’s and after the European 
Communities recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the Turkish 
government did the same and followed course in early 1992, also recognising Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Macedonia as separate independent countries. Turkey had a 
couple of million strong Bosnian originated communities on its soil and this was also 
a pressing factor. From this time Ankara became a busy meeting place for Balkans 
leaders, all involved parties were trying to gain the support of Turkey. 
The real turning point was although the deepening crisis and armed conflict in 
Bosnia, reports have arrived about ethnic cleansing and Turkish politicians felt that 
they need to pursue a more active foreign policy in this issue. Turkey tried to press its 
allies in the EU, NATO, UN and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) and the Turkish government stated that it was satisfied with the 
February 1992 UN sanctions against Serbia. However, Turkey considered the West’s 
reaction too slow and turned towards Muslim organisations, such as the OIC, for 
better co-operation. Turkey, with the help of the OIC, managed to put the situation in 
Bosnia in front of the UN Security Council and also put the conflict “on the table” in 
the CSCE. The new Turkish PM, Suleyman Demiral even proposed a military solution 
for the Bosnian crisis in a meeting with President Bush in July 1992. 
In August 1992, Turkey submitted an action plan, which aimed at ending the 
Serbian aggression in three weeks and unless the Serbs do so UN commanded air 
raids would start against Serb troops and establish “safe heavens” around Muslim 
communities. Turkey saw the Bosnian situation not as a civil war or humanitarian 
crisis, the Turkish government already recognised the independence of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, which was attacked by an aggressor state and these Serbian acts 
should have been stopped immediately. 
The picture even became more blurry for Turkey as Western powers and the UN 
were still unable to reach an agreement to stop the fighting and ethnic killings. 
Turkey’s trust in UN peacekeepers in Bosnia completely vanished when Bosnian 
Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic was killed by Serbian militias on his way back 
to the city from Sarajevo airport and the United Nations Protections Forces 
(UNPROFOR) were unable to protect him.163 Turkish efforts, in connection with the 
West’s and UN’s incompetency, intensified and when a UN Security Council 
resolution adopted a no-fly-zone over Bosnia, Turkey – within the frames of NATO – 
sent fighter jets to keep this resolution in place. However, the arms embargo against 
Bosnia was not lifted up, weapons could not be provided for the Bosnian Muslims. 
On the other hand, Turkey needed to tackle another problem in Bosnia, which was 
the ongoing fighting between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims. The Turkish 
government facilitated a dialogue between the two parts and the negotiations ended 
in the Washington Agreement where the opponent sides agreed to stop hostilities. 
Turkish relations with Croatia improved a lot after the signing of this agreement, trade 
and commercial co-operation were also facilitated between the two countries’ private 
sector. 
The UN also accepted a Turkish contingent to the UNPROFOR in June 1994, albeit 
Turkish participation was rejected at first, due to claims that Turkey’s historical, 
cultural and religious ties were too close with the region 164  but after Russian – 
Serbia’s traditional ally – peacekeepers were incorporated in the the UN mission 
Turkey could not be left out either. The Turkish government facilitated a close 
Bosniak-Croat co-operation because they thought this was the only way to preserve 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial unity. 
 
The Bosnian War resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995), which ended 
hostilities in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, aimed to restore stability in the 
region and established a new political and administrative structure in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina – with significant powers landing in the hands of the international 
community.165  
 
The principles of the after Cold War era Turkish foreign policy were getting visible 
during the Bosnian crisis. Turkey was proactive in all policy aspects (political, 
economic, cultural), did not make any unilateral moves, pursued its policy objectives 
through the international organisations – on a mass scale –, poured humanitarian 
and economic aid into the region – especially to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedoni. The country’s foreign policy priorities included the provision of peace, 
security and stability in the Balkans and to avoid the overspill of the conflict into 
neighbouring Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece and even to Kosovo. Minority 
and ethnic group issues were also taken into consideration, not just the situation of 
the Bosnian Muslims, but those of the Turkish minority in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and 
Greece too. The lack of an adequate Western response also made space for Turkish 
foreign policy to fill in the temporary vacuum and the economic side of the conflict 
could not be ignored that major Turkish trade transit routes to western Europe were 
interrupted, new – and more expensive – options needed to be established so 
Turkey’s aim was to restore the previous stable and secure routes. Indeed, Turkey 
was seen as a country who could constructively contribute to help to tackle the crisis 
and to mediate between the opponents.166 
On the other hand, Turkey’s active involvement in the Balkan crisis were not of 
without criticism. Bosnian Serbs, Serbia and Greece protested against Turkey’s 
increasing role in the Balkans, they claimed that Turkey pursues a hidden agenda 
and would like to reestablish the Ottoman Empire under an Islamic flag. Nonetheless, 
Turkish governments at the beginning of the 1990s did not exploit the “Muslim card” 
in the conflict, they did not portray the crisis as a fight between Islam and Christianity 
and they concentrated on avoiding the even greater escalation of the situation. 
 
The Turkish military also participated in the IFOR and NATO-led SFOR 
peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina167 from 1995 until 2003 – and 
later in the successor mission, EUFOR Althea. 
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2.4 Kosovo 
 
“Power has changed hands many times between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo’s 
turbulent history.”168 Kosovo’s history cannot be understood only in one perspective, 
both nationalities attach special importance and significance to this region, the 
presence of both ethnicities are inseparable in the analysis of this territory. 
Kosovo has been part of Serbia since the 12th century, however, due to the 
disintegration of the Serbian state in the mid 14th century and the Ottoman incursion 
into the territoriy with the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, where Bosnian and Albanian 
troops were also fighting, the territory started to fall under Ottoman rule.169  In the 
second Battle of Kosovo in 1448 there was another attempt by the Hungarian-led 
army to stop the Ottoman expansionism in Europe, however, this attempt failed again. 
By 1455, all Serbian territories, including Kosovo, completely became part of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Prior to the Ottoman rule Kosovo was an economically important area, lying on a 
major trade route and being a rich natural resources deposit. At this time it is widely 
considered that Serbs were in majority in Kosovo – Serbs also consider Kosovo as 
the cradle of their nation –, on the other hand Albanians were also Christians, they 
lived together with Serbs in reasonable harmony.170 We should add that nationality 
was playing a smaller role in that era, religion was the more important factor. 
Kosovo (and Metohia) was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 
15th century and the establishment of the Ottoman administration began immediately. 
Turkish immigrants did not arrive in mass in this period and the majority of the 
population constituted of Christians, Orthodoxs and Roman Catholics. The 
Islamisation171 of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo became widespread in the 17th-18th 
century, with the weakening Ottoman Empire trying to cement together the part of its 
territories and people through to avoid paying higher taxes and to embed themselves 
into the Ottoman society, hierarchy. 
Serbs have started to migrate into northern part of Serbia – and into southern 
Hungary – after a failed uprising in 1689, and this caused the desolation of several 
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areas in Kosovo, where Albanians have moved in later on. Albanian immigration to 
Kosovo also accelerated from Albania in this and the previous periods. 
Kosovo, as one of the four vilayets with Albanian population, took part in the ill-
fated League of Prizren in 1878, in a few years time the whole movement was 
crushed by the Ottomans. Consequent shots to unite Albanian inhabited vilayets into 
one did not succeed and Kosovar Albanians also did not get the promised benefits 
from the Young Turks at the beginning of the 20th century. Despite Kosovo’s and 
Kosovar Albanians’ involvement in the Albanian independence movement, the region 
was annexed by Serbia during the Balkan Wars and it was internationally recognised 
as part of Serbia. 
The history of the Kosovo-Ottoman Empire (and then Turkey) relations from this 
point lost its grounding for decades because these relations developed within the 
Yugoslav-Turkish relations. Serb authorities encouraged the settlement of Serbs and 
other southern Slavs in the region, which facilitated the departure of many Albanians 
and Turks, mostly for Albania and Turkey.172 Kosovo, for a brief period under World 
War II, became part of Greater Albania, however, this entity was dissolved in 1944. 
After the creation of socialist Yugoslavia in 1945, Kosovo was reincorporated into 
Yugoslavia again, this time as an autonomous region called Kosovo and Metohia. 
However, Albanians were not satisfied with this position, they wanted Kosovo to be 
granted the status of republic, as Croatia or Montenegro in the federal system of 
Yugoslavia. Kosovo only gained the status of autonomous province in 1974 but the 
desire for greater independence among Kosovar Albanians rose more in the 
following years, which ended in student riots in 1981. Meanwhile, Serbs have started 
to leave the territory due to the deteriorating relations between the ethnicities and the 
issue of Kosovo became highly politicised. Slobodan Milosevic, as the new President 
of Serbia, withdrew the territory’s autonomous status in 1989, imposing direct rule on 
Kosovo from Belgrade.  
Turkey maintained good relations with Yugoslavia during the Cold War, supporting 
the stability and peaceful existence of the Balkan countries and nations was the top 
priority of the consequent Turkish governments’s policies toward the region, as well 
as to maintain the status quo. Therefore, the issue of Kosovo was not to the fore. 
Nevertheless, with the Iron Curtain falling down and tensions rising in Yugoslavia the 
regional and global picture changed completely and Turkey needed to reconsider 
several of its foreign policy approaches toward this question. 
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Despite the war ended in Bosnia in 1995 and the Dayton agreement marked out the 
principles of a stable and peaceful Bosnia and Herzegovina another problem 
remained unsettled – Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians were hoping to establish their own 
independent entity since decades, but due to historic – Kosovo is seen for many 
Serbs as the cradle of the Serb nation – and domestic political factors this was not 
achievable. The Dayton agreement stated that Kosovo would remain part of federal 
Yugoslavia and this did not strengthen the search for peaceful solutions in the region. 
The self-declared Kosovo parliament declared the territory’s independence in 1991 
and a peaceful separatist movement was organised. However, Serbian authorities 
suppressed the Kosovar Albanian community more and more – reducing cultural 
autonomy and deploying tens of thousands of Serb troops into the area for example 
–, a mass exodus of Albanian immigrants to western Europe has started in this 
period, approximately 400 thousand Kosovar Albanians left Kosovo mainly to avoid 
conscription into the Yugoslav army.173  
A guerilla organisation, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started to become the 
major actor in the situation and during the 1997 domestic turmoil in Albania, the KLA 
acquired more weapons and launched attacks on Serbian armed forces, especially 
policemen. Within weeks a Kosovar uprising was on its way, Serb authorities also 
responded with attacks against the KLA. The conflict deteriorated significantly at the 
beginning of 1999, when signs started to emerge that Serb armed forces were 
proceeding with a systematic ethnic cleansing of civilians. The international 
community tried to settle an agreement between the two sides to end the conflict, 
however, no solution was reached and in March 1999 NATO launched airstrikes 
against Serbia forces which have lasted for more than two months.174  Slobodan 
Milosevic, the hardliner leader of Yugoslavia, after the raids – which destroyed much 
of the infrastructure and economy of Serbia – signed the peace accords which have 
established the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) and the 
NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).  
 
There were no armed conflict in the territory of Kosovo until 1995, although, 
hostilities and human rights violations, killings were reported but by 1995-1996 the 
armed conflict has spread from Bosnia to Kosovo too, the KLA actually staged a war 
against Serb troops. The Serbian army responded with counter-offensives, killing 
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children and women too.175  Western powers (and Russia) chose to intervene in 
defense of the Albanian population and launched an air campaign in 1999 against 
Serbia and the Yugoslav army. Opposite as it was thought by NATO members, 
Milosevic did not capitulate rapidly, but ordered the Yugoslav army to step up against 
the Albanian population. This move had devastating effects: more than 850 thousand 
Albanians fled to neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. With the air campaign 
intensifying and Moscow’s support diminishing Milosevic had no other choice to 
accept the Rambouillet accords, which ended the conflict and established the UN 
administration in Kosovo. 
  
Turkey’s position in the Kosovo conflict was much different, than those in the case 
of Bosnia.176 Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia, granted autonomous province status in 
1974, not an independent state. The Turkish government needed to handle its own 
secessionist movement – the PKK – to preserve the country’s territorial integrity and 
for its own sake it did not want to set out an example by recognising the 
independence of Kosovo. In addition, Turkey was concerned of the Turkish minority 
in Kosovo because this group’s relations with Kosovar Albanians were far from ideal: 
the Serbian government used the divide et impera principal between the Albanians 
and Turks, the Turkish minority’s rights were basically untouched and this caused 
disturbances in the Kosovar Albanian-Turkish relations. On the other hand, the 
Turkish government was worried of the possible overspill of the conflict into 
neighbouring Macedonia – a state with significant Albanian population – with which 
Turkey has established good relations after the country declared independence and 
Macedonia’s stability was seen as a key element of the whole region’s stability in the 
eyes of Turkish decision-makers. Nonetheless, Turkey contributed to the NATO-led 
military mission with fighter jets and with troops to KFOR too, mainly in those areas in 
Kosovo where the Turkish minority lived. 
 
The lower profile Turkish interestedness, compared to Bosnia, was mainly because 
of the capture of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, which coincided with the 
Kosovo war and because of the preparation for the parliamentary elections which 
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were due that spring. However, this did not mean that the Turkish government and 
public was not in favour of intervention in Kosovo, Turkey was again active and 
wanted to contribute to the security and stability of the Balkans. 
 
 
2.5 Regional initiatives, organisations 
 
We should also mention the regional organisations in a nutshell, which have started 
to emerge in the 1990s reflecting the changing global, political structure and relations 
and the changes after the crisis in Bosnia. Turkey was actively involved in all 
initiatives. Several of these organisations helped to incorporate the newly established 
Balkan states (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina) into the international sphere and those 
which were completely outsiders in previous decades (like Albania). The EU and the 
US took the lead in helping these initiatives become realised but Balkan countries 
also realised that regional co-operation could be a milestone in bilateral and 
multilateral relations and some initiatives came from within the Balkans (like SEECP). 
On the other hand, not all organisations and co-operation forms proved to be of great 
success – some disappeared or got incorporated into EU initiatives –, however 
several of them served to facilitate better understanding and regional co-operation.  
Organisations and initiatives established in this period (I am just going to mention 
them here):177 
 
• Royamount Process 
• Southeast European Co-operation Initiatve (SECI) 
• Southeast European Co-operation Process (SEECP) 
• Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe 
• Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation (BSEC) 
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3. Neo-Ottomanism in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo today 
 
“The Balkans is a priority for Turkey from the perspectives of geographical position, 
economy, culture as well as historical and human bonds [...] Turkey, as a regional 
country, attaches special importance to its relations with Balkan countries […] Turkey, 
conscious of her responsibilities to the peace and stability of the Balkans […] In 
parallel with this understanding, Turkey believes that the vital contribution for a better 
future in the region will come from Balkan states themselves, thus, cordially 
interested in development of genuine cooperation mechanisms in the Balkans”.178 
These sentences reflect how Turkish foreign policy thinks about the Balkans today, 
every important aspect and vision is incorporated here, into the “special importance” 
expression which the Balkans occupy in current Turkish foreign policy. 
Turkey’s emphasis on the three Muslim majority/plurality country in the region 
greatly increased in the last decade. Turkey considers all of these countries as 
neighbours, despite they do not share a common border and its relations are 
formulated according to this. All three countries are new democracies, Kosovo being 
the youngest state in Europe, are both geographically and in terms of population 
small countries in Europe, economically underdeveloped and have no fast EU 
membership prospects – although some are impatiently waiting for the green light for 
candidate status (Albania for example). Turkey, as an experienced member of the 
international community, with the 17th biggest economy in the world – and rapidly 
growing179 –, a strenghtening democracy could provide more than useful assistance 
and forms of co-operation for these countries. The common cultural and historical 
connection points are also emphasised more these days, and the majority of these 
countries’ politicians observe Turkey’s approximation positively. The mutual interest 
and common advantages started to overrule the differences. 
I need to note here that these three countries, despite the constantly improving and 
developing relations since the fall of the Iron Curtain, are still lagging backwards in 
trade with Turkey, compared to other Balkan countries. 180  However, Turkish 
                                                 
178 "Relations with the Balkan Region" Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ?. 14 Apr. 2011 <http:// 
www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-with-the-balkan-region.en.mfa>. 
179 Landon, Thomas Jr. "Turning East, Turkey Asserts Economic Power" The New York Times. 5 Jul. 2011. 14 
Apr. 2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/business/global/06lira.html?_r=1&ref=turkey>. 
180 Plus, the level of Turkish investments is also low compared to neighbouring countries. See: "Surveying 
Turkish Influence in the Western Balkans" STRATFOR. 1 Sep. 2011. 20 Apr. 2011 <http://www.stratfor.co 
m/analysis/20100831_surveying_turkish_influence_wes
 55
companies are really interested in the region and willing to invest there, as Cengiz 
Aktar puts it: 
 
“Turkey has the advantage of having a very aggressive and effective 
business community”. 
 
He adds that there are mainly SMEs investing in these countries, Turkish 
companies see a vacuum to step in. Besidese these, due to these countries’ past ties 
with Turkey, as described several times in the previous chapters, the political 
situation favours Turkish involvement and there is a huge potential in bilateral 
developments in the future. More than half of total Turkish investment in Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo (and Serbia) has been realised since 2005,181 the 
dynamic of Turkish economic involvement is accelerating. 
 
Neo-Ottomanism is clearly the driving policy frame of Turkish foreign policy 
regarding this region, the proactive approach – with Turkey’s soft power initiatives – 
in the Balkans with all of its positive aspects, which takes mutual interests and 
enhanced co-operation into account, emphasising the shared past and cultural 
traditions. I would use the following chapter to underpin this sentence and to analyse 
the relations between the three countries in focus and Turkey. 
 
 
3.1 Albania 
 
Bilateral and multilaterally framed relations have been steadily developing since the 
turn of the new millennium between the two countries. The Kosovo conflict in 1999 
was a milestone in bilateral relations, Turkey has realised that the stable and 
peaceful co-existence of the countries in the Balkans require an active and 
constructive approach from the Turkish side, taking multilateral aspects into 
consideration too when negotiating with individual states in the region. 
With the AK Party getting into government in Turkey in 2002 and the 
multidimensional foreign policy approach formulating with more and more focus on 
the economic side of the co-operation, this trend also become more visible in 
relations with Albania. On the other hand, the focus on economic relations did not 
                                                 
181 Hamidi, Lavdim. "Turkey's Balkan Shopping Spree" BalkanInsight. 7 Dec. 2010. 14 Apr. 2011 <http://ww 
w.balkaninsight.com/en/article/turkey-s-balkan-shopping-spree>. 
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cast shadows on other forms of co-operation, political, humanitarian, cultural, 
defense, justice, visa regime, police etc. co-operation between the two countries 
strengthened much in the last ten years. 
 
3.1.1 Politics 
 
According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry182 relation between the two countries are 
excellent and the views on several policy approaches – regarding the regional and 
international field – of Turkey and Albania are almost identical.183 
Political relations between Turkey and Albania have been on the rise, especially 
after Erdogan’s visit to Tirana in 2005.184 During this visit the Turkish PM said that 
Albania has a special place in Turkish foreign policy and pledged support for the 
Albanian NATO membership. Erdogan stated that Albania’s Euro-Atlantic integration 
would be a strategic advantage. His Albanian counterpart, Fatos Nano also praised 
Erdogan’s visit, saying that the military and political relations are perfect between the 
countries, now the economic ones need to be developed. Erdogan reiterated his 
support again for Albania’s NATO membership in another visit to Tirana in 2008,185 
and the Albanian PM, Sali Berisha stated that the EU would not be complete without 
Turkey’s integration186 and he also supported Turkey bid for a temporary seat in the 
UN Security Council.187 Albania’s NATO membership was accepted at the Bucharest 
Summit in 2008 and the country became a member in April, 2009. The improvement 
of economic and cultural collaboration were the main topics during this meeting. 
Erdogan and Berisha have met during 2009 and 2010 too, mainly in connection with 
Albanian construction projects, conducted by Turkish firms. 
Besides the good relations between the PMs, the Presidents of Albania and Turkey 
also found the way for common understanding. In a 2009 visit to Tirana, Turkish 
                                                 
182 "Turkey's Political Relations with Albania" Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ?. 17 Apr. 2011 
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-albania.en.mfa>. 
183 I should note here that we should handle all governmental official statements with reservation: almost in all 
cases relations are “excellent”, “fruitful” and “developing” and this is especially right for the current Turkish 
FM’s langauge. The excrescent expressions might mask some problematic points which the countries do not 
want to promote or expose. 
184 Pulaj, Ardi. "Turkey's Erdogan Visits Albania" SETimes.com. 17 Feb. 2005. 17 Apr. 2011 <http://www.s 
etimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2005/02/17/feature-02?print=yes>. 
185 "Turkey vows to support Albania's NATO bid" SETimes.com. 27 Mar. 2008. 17 Apr. 2011 <http://ww 
w.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/mobile/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2008/03/27/nb-07>. 
186 Berisha’s statement was rather interesting because Albania was and still not an EU member, not even an 
official candidate country.  
187 "Turkey supports Albania’s NATO bid, gains support for its UNSC drive" Today's Zaman. 27 Mar. 2008. 17 
Apr. 2011 <http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=E9E52C0B24CFC889 
7BB2D86CF1DF9500?load=detay&link=137412&newsId=137325>. 
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President Abdullah Gül stated 188 on a meeting with Albanian President Bamir Topi, 
that there is a real friendship between the two countries and Turkey considers 
Albania as a strategic partner in the region. Gül also expressed his satisfaction that 
Albania promised to raise its number of troops in Afghanistan and stated that Turkey 
supports Albania’s NATO membership process. 
Turkey’s political proactivity regarding Albania was also visible during the Turkish 
chairmainship of the Southeast European Co-operation Process (SEECP). Turkish 
FM Ahmet Davutoglu on a visit to Tirana in 2009 noted,189 there were no problems 
between the two countries and they have been approaching issues in the Balkans 
from the same point of view. Davutoglu also agreed with his Albanian colleague, Illir 
Meta, to mutually lift visa requirements. This agreement has taken effect in 2010.190 
Besides the mutual PM, FM and Presidential visits, there are frequent visits of other 
ministers too, mainly connected to increasing economic and business co-operation. 
For example Turkish State Minister Aliye Kavaf visited Tirana in February 2010, 
where she highlighted191 the strategic partnership between the two countries and that 
Albania and Turkey are the two stability factors in the Balkans. Kavaf added that 
Turkey expects that economic relations with Albania will improve in the future and 
more Turkish FDI – already over one billion US dollars – arrive in Albania. 
Former politicians also like to take part in discourses when there are chances to 
voice the “bright future” regarding the co-operation of Turkey and the Balkans, with 
the EU. For example Suleyman Demiral former Turkish President stated192  in a 
conference in April 2011 that if Europe wants to remain a politically and economically 
important actor in the global sphere it would definitely need Turkey and the Balkans – 
inside the European community. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188 "Albania is our strategic partner in the region" Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. 10 Dec. 2009. 17 Apr. 
2011 <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/397/48524/albania-is-our-strategic-partner-in-the-region.html>. 
189 Sagir, Celil. "Albania, Turkey reaffirm joint view on Balkans, Mediterranean" Today's Zaman. 19 Oct. 2009. 
18 Apr. 2011 <http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=783F91612A1DE6 
3057B2753849897CA4?newsId=190323>. 
190 "Albania, Turkey launch visa-free travel" SETimes.com. 10 Feb. 2010. 18 Apr. 2011 <http://www.setime 
s.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2010/02/10/nb-03>. 
191 "Turkey, Albania strategic partners in Balkans" Hürriyet Daily News. 21 Feb. 2010. 18 Apr. 2011 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-albania-strategic-partners-in-the-region-2010-02-21>. 
192 "Turkey, Balkans could be wings of Europe" Hürriyet Daily News. 13 Apr. 2010. 18 Apr. 2011 <http:// 
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3.1.2 Economy 
 
The economic part of the Albanian-Turkish relations is the most visible aspect of 
Turkey’s approach towards the country, economic relations have gradually changed 
after an FTA took effect between Turkey and Albania in 2008.193 Whereas Turkish 
exports – mainly industrial products194 – to Albania were only 79 million US dollars in 
2002, this number climped up to 241 million in 2010.195 On the other hand, Albanian 
exports to Turkey – mostly leather, iron scrap, vegetable seeds, timber – are on a 
much lower scale, with a continuous increase until 2008, reaching 22 million US 
dollars, this data dropped to 5,8 million in 2009 but jumped to 86 million in 2010.196197 
As we see, there is a large trade surplus in favour of Turkey. In addition to the 
increasing volume of bilateral trade, Turkish investments in Albania have reached 
one billion dollar in 2010,198 with a sharp – 60 percent – growth from 2008199 and by 
reaching this number, Turkey became the third largest investor in Albania.200 Main 
focus areas of Turkish investments are infrastructure, telecommunications and the 
banking sector. Tourism is currently an underdeveloped sector in the relations, only 
50 thousand Albanians visited Turkey in 2007.201 There are currently 80 Turkish 
companies operating in Albania.  
In the following paragraph, I will list the key Turkish investments: 
 
• A consortium of Türk Telekom and Calik Holding bought Albania’s only 
landline operator, Albtelecom – which also owns a mobile network, Eagle 
                                                 
193 "Business: Albania, Turkey sign Free Trade Agreement" SETimes.com. 29 Dec. 2006. 18 Apr. 2011 
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194 "Turkey´s Commercial and Economic Relations With Albania" Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign 
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200 Hamidi, Lavdim. "Turkey's Balkan Shopping Spree" BalkanInsight. 7 Dec. 2010. 14 Apr. 2011 <http://www 
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201 "Turkey´s Commercial and Economic Relations With Albania" Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign 
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Mobile – in 2005 for 151 million US dollars.202 Eagle Mobile’s market share is 
steadily growing and might enter the Kosovar market in the near future 
too.203 
• Calik Holding is also interested in another major sector, it became sole 
owner of the National Commercial Bank (NCB) in 2009. 204  NCB is the 
second largest bank in terms of size in Albania and already opened 
branches in Kosovo too. Albanian President Bamir Topi not long ago talked 
about Calik Holding as a “very important establishment”205 for Albania and 
thanked all those investments which the company made in his country. 
• Turkey’s ENKA and US based Bechtel has built a 1,4 billion US dollars worth 
170 kms long highway in northern Albania.206 The inauguration ceremony 
was attended by both countries’ PMs.  
• Universal Hospitals Group of Turkey opened its first hospital abroad in 
Tirana.207 
 
The political support behind these investments – and following ones for the future – 
is particularly high. Besides the PMs presence at important economic events, 
speakers of both parliaments,208 Presidents209 also emphasise the importance and 
need for further Turkish investments in Albania, stating that one of the main reasons 
why they really like to invest in that country because they “feel home” there. This 
emphasis also appears at multilateral meetings, where the main topics are increasing 
trade and investment.210 
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Another important factor in the Albanian-Turkish economic relations is the energy 
aspect. Turkey, in connection with its other regional projects – the Nabucco for 
example –, takes Albania into account as a participating member in the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline natural gas pipeline project which would bring Iranian gas to the 
western European markets.211 The project is in a rather underdeveloped phase and 
the political situation with Iran is not working for the realisation of the issue, however, 
with several Western companies – like EGL or Statoil – committing themselves for 
the pipeline the project, Albania’s and Turkey’s role and co-operation should not be 
neglected. 
 
3.1.3 Defense, culture, religion 
 
The military, humanitarian co-operation between the two countries have seen 
unprecedented development in the last more than a decade. With Turkey’s constant 
support for Albania’s NATO accession, which eventually happened in 2009, Turkey 
provided 80 millions US dollars of military aid to Albania since 1998,212 assisting the 
Albanian military to reach NATO standards, renewed a military base, helped to 
ugrade a naval one, supported training of several units and there is a co-operation 
between the military education of the two countries too. Joint naval exercises also 
took place, angering Greece in one occasion. 213  In addition, currently there are 
Albanian soldiers being trained in Turkey.214 Moreover, the Albanian government not 
long ago has promoted the Turkish military attache for his outstanding services he 
made during his stay in Albania.215 
Regarding the humanitarian part of the co-operation between Albania and Turkey 
the last example of this collaboration was the participation of the Turkish army’s 
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helicopters in a disaster management last December, when parts of Albania were 
heavily flooded.216  
 
The cultural relations – one could say that Turkey’s cultural relations with Albania 
and not vice versa – between the countries seem to be excellent and diversified. 
However, there is a wide debate going on in Albania right now that what was their 
country’s position and how were Albanians treated under Ottoman rule. The reason 
of this is that many people have started to question those images which were 
portrayed about the Ottomans and Ottoman Albania in the nation-building process in 
the 19th-20th century and during communism too.217 Some politicians argue that there 
is a pressure from Turkey to change history books for example, to soften the picture 
on the Ottomans, but others say that this new approach towards that era is due to the 
more sophisticated approach to social sciences and an interest in that period. 
Nonetheless, the Ottoman past and architectural heritage is often emphasised in 
Turkish newspapers when talking about Albania, 218  there are several Turkish 
educational institutions in Albania – one being the biggest complex constructed in the 
country in the last 20 years – with 2 500 graduates from these schools so far219 and 
there is also the possibility to take free Turkish classes in the country. TRT Avaz, 
Turkey’s state-run television network’s service for the region spanning from Central 
Asia to the Balkans has also started broadcasting news in Albanian (and Bosnian) 
from 2010.220 In addition, several Turkish soap operas were also sold to Albanian 
networks,221 strenghtening the interest in Turkey and Turkish culture too. 
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Literature also deserves a place in this enumeration. Orhan Pamuk, Turkey’s Nobel 
Prize-winning writer received an honorary doctorate from Tirana University in 
2010.222 Pamuk’s books have been the best-selling books in Albania since 2006. 
 
Regarding religion, it is officially not part of the bilateral relations. Under 
communism, Albania was officially an atheist country but (Ottoman) Islam was 
practised in  secret.223 After the end of communism, there was a “religious vacuum”, 
Albanian Islam was basically non-existent, younger Albanians did not practise 
religion much. First, Arab organisations brought in money and resources to the 
financially weak Albanian Islam structure, but by some Muslims they were considered 
as “alien” to Albanian society. After the expulsion and departure of Arab charities and 
communities backed organisations from Albania after 9/11, Turkish Islam started to 
dominate the Albanian religious sphere. The Turkish International Co-operation and 
Development Angecy (TIKA) also helps to restore Muslim community buildings, 
cultural centres in Albania,224 Albanians ask Diyanet – the highest Islamic religious 
authority of Turkey – to arrange their hajj.225 The Gülen movement, one of the most 
important religious groups in Turkey, has an extensive educational system in Albania 
and operate religious and non-religious schools throughout the country. The first 
Islamic university in Albania has just opened recently with the help of SEMA 
Foundation, which is supported by the Gülen movement.226 The Albanian PM was 
also present at the opening. 
Some Albanians observe this as a positive sign, the moderate wing of Islam is 
strengthening in their country, while others see this as a return of the Ottomans which 
pushes them away from closer European integration. 
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3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s relations with Turkey are perhaps the most interesting 
and debated one from the three countries in this list. “The BiH [Bosnian] public has 
thus split into those that are emotionally-euphoric and those that pragmatically-
sceptical about Turkey’s new role”.227 The multiethnic country is not just officially 
divided into several entities, but the discourse between the entities’ political, 
economic and cultural sphere is also rather limited. Turkey’s activity in the country is 
also perceived according to these divisions reflected in the Bosnian society, Bosnian 
Serbs (and Croats) generally oppose the increasing Turkish role, 228  whereas 
Bosniaks support Turkey’s initiatives in the country.229 These divisions often become 
quite visible during sport events.230 
Turkey’s proactive foreign policy toward Bosnia is possibly also of a product of the 
“Butmir process”,231 Turkey was left out from the EU-US sponsored talks to settle 
disputes between Bosnian communities, and started its own initiative to overcome 
obstacles within the multiethnic state. 
 
3.2.1 Politics 
 
First of all, Turkey considers Bosnia as a country which always had privileged place 
in Turkish foreign policy.232 The principals of Turkey’s approach to Bosnia are to 
preserve the country’s territorial integrity and independence, and to maintain peace 
and stability in Bosnia. Turkey’s diplomatic and political activity toward Bosnia is not 
only concentrated on the bilateral, we can say “business as usual” ties, but on 
mediating in several serious issues, including a Serbian apology last year for the 
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Srebrenica massacre, brokering an appointment of a Bosnian envoy to Serbia233 – 
after a three-year-long hiatus – and offering help to the country’s communities to 
overcome the obstacles which prevented them from forming a government.234 
High level visits of Turkish politicians have become frequent in recent years. The 
Turkish PM paid official visits to Bosnia in 2008 and 2010 too. During these visits 
Erdogan emphasised the improvement of relations with Bosnia,235 Turkey considers 
the integrity of Bosnia as top priority for the stability in the Balkans and will never 
abandon Bosnia because of Turkey’s “historical responsibility”. 236  Erdogan also 
voiced his support for Bosnia’s EU and NATO membership during the meetings in 
Bosnia. Members of the Bosnian tripartite Presidency visited Turkey in 2008, PM of 
Bosnia, Nikola Spiric paid an official visit to Turkey in 2009 where Erdogan stated 
that the relations between the two countries were “excellent”237 and the improving 
relations between Turkey and Bosnia were mainly because of the close ties between 
the people of the two countries. 
The Turkish President and FM are also not lagging behind Erdogan, Abdullah Gül 
is also active in issues connected to Bosnia. On his visit to Sarajevo in 2010, Gül also  
affirmed Turkey’s support for Bosnia’s territorial integrity and claimed that they would 
like to see the region becoming the “heart of Europe”.238 Gül could particularly like 
this expression, because he repeated it in April 2011 too.239 
 The Turkish President also participated at several multilateral meetings, often 
mediating and involving more actors to settle disputes between the entities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and also between Bosnia and Serbia.240 During one of the last of 
these meetings in Turkey in April 2010, the three involved actors signed the Istanbul 
Declaration which commits these countries to preserve the territorial integrity of 
Bosnia. The reason why this integrity is emphasised much recently, is because the 
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parliament of the Serb entity of Bosnia, Republika Srpska, passed a law making 
referendums easier, which could reflect a possible independece vote in the future.241 
Besides Gül, Ahmet Davutoglu also appears as a great mediator between Bosnia 
and Serbia, he was the one who could stand victoriously onto the stage when Bosnia 
managed to appoint an envoy to Serbia in 2010. The Turkish FM was also the one, 
who managed to push through – quite aggressively – a NATO Membership Action 
Plan (MAP) for Bosnia last year.242 In addition, his (in)famous – matter of perspective 
– speech in Sarajevo on 2009 was the one which has underlined the key principles 
and thoughts of Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans.243 
 
Political relations with the various communities in Bosnia are also worth to note 
here. Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosniak member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency, was 
treated as a friend on his visit to Turkey in 2010 244  and Turkish support was 
confirmed during his stay both from Erdogan and Gül.  
Bosnian Serb politicians – like the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik 
and the Serb member of the Bosnian presidency, Nebojsa Radmanovic – often voice 
their concerns over Turkey’s policy toward Bosnia and they face difficulties when 
meeting with Turkish politicians. Dodik accused Turkey of interfering into Bosnia’s 
domestic affairs blaiming Turkey of favouring only on community, the Bosniaks.245 
However, this January Dodik said much moderate sentences when he met with 
Davutoglu in Banja Luka,  and supported the territorial integrity of Bosnia and invited 
the Turkish FM for a conference to Republika Srpska. On the other hand, 
Radmanovic needed to cancel a meeting with Davutoglu, due to a “flag row”: the 
Turkish FM insisted that the flags of Republika Srpska should be removed from the 
rooms of the government building in Banja Luka but the flags remained and 
Davutoglu was not willing to hold a press conference in front of those flags.246 
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The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko, who holds 
protectorate powers in Bosnia praised Turkey’s involvement in the country, stating 
that Turkish foreign policy has adopted a “balanced approach” toward all ethnic 
minorities in Bosnia.247 
 
There is also a bilateral visa-free travel agreement between Turkey and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
 
3.2.2 Economy 
 
Turkey provided 80 million dollars for the reconstruction in Bosnia through 
Eximbank credits, this was in addition to the 32 million dollars pledged for bilateral 
and humanitarian assistance. 248  Turkey and Bosnia have signed 36 bilateral 
agreements on promotion and protection of investments with Turkey.249 
Another important factor regarding the economic relations between Turkey and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is that an FTA is in place between the two countries since 
2003.250 Turkish exports to Bosnia have been steadily increasing: in 2002 the value 
of Turkish exports were only 43 million US dollars, this number jumped to 572 million 
by 2008.251 However, the value of Turkish exports suffered a great decrease in 2009, 
totaling around 224 million US dollars and in 2010 this indicator even shrunk with two 
million. Main Turkish export products are diesel engine vehicles, glassware, carpets 
etc. 
Bosnian exports to Turkey were only six million US dollars in 2002, but this number 
has increased heavily, reaching 72 million in 2010. 252  Although, there is a 
considerably big trade deficit for Bosnia, but the volume of trade exports to Turkey 
increased 12-fold in the last eight years and this is not a negligible fact. Bosnian 
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exports include mainly copper, electric locomotives, chemical products etc., mostly 
products made by Turkish companies in Bosnia. 
Turkey is the eighth biggest investor in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an estimated 
197 million US dollars, since 1994.253 One of the main reasons for the low level of 
Turkish investments is the divided and multi-tiered government structure in Bosnia,254 
however Turkish investments in 2009 jumped to 45 million US dollars, becoming the 
fourth biggest investor in Bosnia that year.255 
The tourism sector is rather underdeveloped between the two countries, there were 
around 40 thousand Bosnian tourists who visited Turkey in 2006.256 
Major Turkish investment in Bosnia include: 
 
• In 2008 Turkey – Turkish Airlines (THY) actually – bought 49 percent of 
Bosnia’s national carrier, B&H Airlines, and is very likely to buy the remaning 
51 percent government stake in the company in the near future.257 THY 
committed itself to invest 6,6 million US dollars in leasing two aircrafts and 
another 3,4 million as company reserves, plus financing B&H Airlines’ debts, 
which are currently 11 million dollars. 
• A Turkish oil company, Türkoil has just entered Bosnia, leasing 50 percent of 
the country’s total gas delivery.258 
• The Turkish Ziraat Bank Group appeared in Bosnia in 1997 and operate 21 
branches across the country. 259  The company reported a profit of 730 
thousand dollars in 2010.260 
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The Bosnian political support behind the Turkish-Bosnian economic co-operation is 
divided, as is the case with the bilateral political relations. The major Turkish 
investments focus on the Bosniak-Croat inhabited Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Serb inhabited Republika Srpska is almost entirely an empty area 
in Turkish investments, no information could be found on any bigger Turkish 
investment in the Serb entity. 
Bakir Izetbegovic has been a key promoter of attracting foreign investments into 
Bosnia, he was also one of the patrons of this year’s Sarajevo Business Forum, 
where many Turkish companies were present, 261   Turkish state-controlled bank 
Eximbank even announced the extension of credit lines to Bosnia.262263 Erdogan also 
pledged support for Turkish investments in Bosnia on his 2010 visit, emphasising the 
importance of Bosnia’s richness in natural resources.264  
 
3.2.3 Defense, culture, religion 
 
The most important factor in the defense or military field is that Turkey participates 
with 255 soldiers265 in the EU’s 1 600 troop strong EUFOR Althea military operation 
in Bosnia, which supervises the implementation of the Dayton agreement.266  
On the other hand, military co-operation between the two countries has just started 
to emerge in the past years, 267  state-run Turkish company MKEK signed an 
agreement with Bosnian Unis Frop on joint producing and marketing of defense 
industry products.268 However, this is seen rather as a Turkish gesture for Bosnia, 
which is trying to rebuild its once prosperous arms production industry, mostly 
damaged and disappeared during the Bosnian War. 
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Nevertheless, deeper military co-operation between Bosnia and Turkey could be a 
sensitive issue because it might evoke the disfavour of the Bosnian Serb and Croat 
communities, that are already suspicious about Turkey’s initiatives toward Bosnia. 
However, another aspect of co-operation, namely humanitarian and disaster 
assistance, has been one of the architects of Turkish involvement in Bosnia, the 
Turkish government and Red Crescent organisation recently provided aid during the 
floods in 2010.269 
 
Bosnian-Turkish cultural connections, relations mainly exist between the Bosniak 
community and Turkey. Bosnian Serbs are strongly against any Turkish involvement, 
populist politicians accuse Ankara of a pro-Muslim approach 270  and that Turkey 
would like to create an Islamic state in Bosnia.271 Bosnian Serb politicians often line 
up with academics, to prove that Turkey has a “hidden agenda”.272 Only 40 percent of 
Bosnians – almost the same percentage as the Bosniaks in Bosnia – consider Turkey 
as a friendly nation.273 Turkey, Turkish organisations have been providing resources 
and assistance for several project in this field to Bosnia – mainly to the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina – but in this atmosphere and given Bosnia’s decentralised 
state structure it is really hard to say that there have been much emphasis on 
Republika Srpska. However, the Serb entity was also not quite keen on to ask for and 
accept any Turkish aid, help, assistance etc., Bosnian Serb paramilitaries – and 
Croatian nationalists – destroyed Ottoman-era urban structures, mosques during the 
Bosnian War.274 
In addition, Turkey’s relations with Bosnian Muslims also have another expect: 
there are millions of Bosnian originated Turkish nationals who often voice their views 
when they think that Bosniaks are maltreated or offended (e.g. the Emir Kusturica 
case in Antalya).275 
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However, Turkey is extensively developing its educational and cultural relations 
with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia is the biggest receiver of 
TIKA funds from those countries which received resources from Turkey’s 
development agency. Bosnia received more than 23 million US dollars until 2006,276 
and the organisation has been involved in further Bosnian hospital and school 
renovation projects, along with the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exhchanges (TOBB).277 Education has been one of the key pillars of Turkey’s cultural 
relations with Bosnia, there are two Turkish-funded universities in Bosnia, the 
International University of Sarajevo (IUS) and the International Burch University (IBU). 
The IUS is funded by the Gülen movement.278 There is a high number of Turkish 
students studying at both universities. 
TRT Avaz, Turkey’s state-run television network’s service for the region spanning 
from Central Asia to the Balkans has also started broadcasting news in Bosnian (and 
Albanian) from 2010.279 Appearing Turkish soap operas,280 especially “Binbir gece” 
(A Thousand and One Nights), not only provided entertainment for Bosnians, but also 
changed (changing) the image of Turkey, causing an increased interest in Istanbul 
and Turkish language.281 
 
Religion has been on of the main factors which primarily divides the communities of 
Bosnia. The debate – over religion, identity – is often fueled by the clergies. For 
example the grand mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mustafa Efendi Ceric claimed in 
2008 that “we are Turks” and “Turkey is our mother”. 282  Milorad Dodik in turn 
frequently scoots to Belgrade to receive support from the Serbian Orthodox Church 
for his policies. 
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Bosnia has also become a major destination for Turkish students, who would like to 
avoid the headscarf ban in Turkish universities.283 Religious women students, who 
are mainly from religious high schools in Turkey, can also attend Bosnian univerities, 
there is no such ban in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The majority of these students 
attends the Turkish-funded universities. 
 
 
3.3 Kosovo 
 
Kosovo’s declaration of independece in February 2008 has popped up 
uncomfortable issues for Turkey. A new, Muslim majority European republic was 
important for Turkey, however, if they would recognise the independence of Kosovo, 
they might create a precedent – even though both the EU and Turkey stated that this 
is not a precedent – for more countries to follow. Including territories, which are in the 
proximity of Turkey and hindered relations with neighbouring countries: the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus – only recognised by Turkey –, Nagorno-Karabakh – a 
de facto independent country, officially recognised as part of Azerbaijan, a key ally of 
Turkey – and also the Kurds in Turkey, where a guerilla movement tries to create an 
autonomous Kurdistan since 1978. 
However, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognise the independence of 
Kosovo,284 stating that it was inevitable to ensure peace and stability in the region,285 
and became an advocate – especially to convince OIC countries to recognise Kosovo 
– of the new country’s further embedding into the international community286 and also 
to economically develop Kosovo. 
 
3.3.1 Politics 
 
The political relations between the two countries are really new, due to the fact that 
Kosovo has just become independent a little more than three years ago. However, 
the newly established relations seem to be quite fruitful and strong. Nonetheless, 
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Serbs living in northern Kosovo – an area not under the control of the Kosovar 
government – do not favour Turkish rapprochement.287 Turkey was the first country 
where Kosovo opened an embassy. 288  The first Turkish PM visit happened in 
November 2010, when Erdogan traveled to Kosovo. During his visit, outgoing 
Kosovar PM, Hashim Thaci called Erdogan “Kosovo’s hero”289 and revealed that, 
according to him, the Turkish PM urged the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 
2008. Thaci has previously visited Turkey that year, signing various agreements, 
where he praised bilateral relations, called Turkey as a strategic partner290 and called 
for further co-operation.291 Turkey has promised to support Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic 
integration, which the Kosovar government is aiming at. Erdogan also said that 
Turkey was ready to mediate the upcoming, now ongoing, talks between Kosovo and 
Serbia.292 However, these talks are currently managed under the auspices of the EU. 
Besides the PMs, the Presidents of the two countries also voiced very positive 
views on the bilateral relations. Fatmir Sejdiu, now former president of Kosovo, 
described bilateral ties as “golden relations”293 and stated on his visit to Turkey in 
2010 that Turkey stood by Kosovars “at the darkest moments” of their history.294 The 
Turkish President stated, there is an “unreserved solidarity” between the two 
countries and Kosovo’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community will bring peace 
and stability into the region.  
Kosovo also takes Turkey as a model country, an example to be followed. Jakup 
Krasniqi, speaker of the Kosovar parliament, stated in July 2009 after a meeting with 
his Turkish counterpart, that all countries of the region should look at Turkey as an 
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example.295 There is also a visa-free agreement between Turkey and Kosovo, signed 
in 2009, during the Turkish FM’s first visit to Pristina.296 
 
3.3.2 Economy 
 
Economic relations between Kosovo and Turkey are developing in a very 
accelerating speed since the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008. First of 
all, Turkey provided 30 million euros for Kosovo in 2008 to rebuild its destroyed 
economy. 297  An FTA between the two countries is likely to take effect in the 
upcoming months and this could boost bilateral economic relations.298 
Data for Turkish exports to Kosovo is only available since 2006, but there is a 
steady increase visible during the past four years. In 2006 Turkish exports were 71 
million US dollars,299 but in 2010 this number jumped to 294 million – surpassing the 
volume of Turkish exports to Bosnia and Albania.300  
Kosovar exports to Turkey were almost negligible in 2007, only three million US 
dollars. Although, by 2010 this has increased significantly, totaling 13 million that year. 
There is a huge trade deficit for Kosovo in the trade with Turkey. 
There is no actual number on Turkish investments in Kosovo, we can just estimate 
how much money Turkish companies have invested there according to several recent 
acquisitions. 
These include: 
 
• A Turkish-French consortium has just taken over Pristina Airport, Kosovo’s 
only airport, for 20 years and the joint company needs to invest 140 million 
euros to upgrade the facility and build a new terminal by 2012.301 
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• Bechtel-Enka, a US-Turkey consortium has won a tender last year to build 
the Pristina-Durres (Albania) highway and also to a section to Serbia. The 
value of the project is around 700 million302 – or one billion according to 
other sources303 – euros, it is the most expensive such project in the region. 
• Medicine Hospital Group has made its first international investment in 
Kosovo with establishing a heart hospital in Pristina. The value of the Turkish 
investment was 15 million euros.304 In the next five years the company plans 
to open several other hospitals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and 
Macedonia. 
 
The political support behind Turkish investments is really solid and enthusiastic, as 
we saw at Fatmir Sejdiu’s statements for example. Not just the highest level 
politicians are eager to voice their commitments toward furthering bilateral co-
operation, but ministers are also calling for increasing Turkish investments in Kosovo, 
possibly considering Kosovo as a European gateway for Turkish goods.305 Turkish, 
and any other foreign investments are definitely needed in Kosovo where the central 
government and local companies have hardly any money to invest. 
On the other hand, Kosovars do not want too much dependency on Turkey, they 
have just achieved their independency.306 There are also some critical voices, mainly 
from the analyst/expert community in Kosovo, who consider increasing Turkish 
economic involvement in Kosovo as a disadvantage because other nations are 
leaving the country, diversification of investments suffered backlashes.307 
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3.3.3 Defense, the Turkish minority, culture 
 
A significant point in the relations is that KFOR troops are still in Kosovo, within UN 
frames, and Turkey is one of the biggest contributors to these troops, currently with 
479 soldiers.308 
On the other hand, military co-operation between the two countries has just started, 
with an agreement signed in February 2010. 309  This agreement provides the 
possibility for Kosovar soldiers to get training in Turkey and also Turkish arms might 
arrive in the future into the country. In addition, Turkish KFOR troops also provide 
training for Kosovar troops and there is a police co-operation going on between the 
two states, Turkey offered 4-5 year long trainings for selected Kosovars.310 
Regarding the humanitarian assistance part, Turkey is helping Kosovo in the health 
sector, donating vaccines against swine flu for example.311 
 
Co-operation in the field of education is also on the rise, Kosovo has a Turkish 
minority of 25-30 thousand but there are more than 300 thousand people who could 
speak Turkish, which is an official language of Kosovo today. 312  The situation 
regarding Kosovo’s Turkish minority is improving because Turks felt alienated after 
the UN administration settled itself in Kosovo in 1999: Turkish as an official language 
was abolished and many of their other rights were taken away.313 However, Turkey 
still considers this point as an issue to mention at almost any meeting, to state that 
the Turkish minority’s rights are really important. 
Turkish soap operas, just like in Bosnia and Albania, are among the most watched 
TV programmes in Kosovo.314  One of the recently arrived shows also portray a 
Kosovar immigrant in Turkey and considered by several members of the audience as 
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a good example how Kosovar Albanians in Turkey “have preserved the true Kosovar 
traditions”.315 
 
TIKA is also active in Kosovo, mainly involved in renovation, protection of historical 
and cultural heritage.316 
 
 
4. Turkey’s EU prospects: implications for Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo317 
 
Both Turkey’s and the western Balkans’ aims are Euro-Atlantic integration but this 
process moves forward rather slowly, particularly in recent years. Albania’s, Bosnia’s 
and Kosovo’s increased co-operation with Turkey is not an alternative to EU 
membership, it is just an additional impetus for stabilisation and economic growth, 
according to Cengiz Aktar. 
Some countries are already official EU candidate countries, others are just potential 
candidates. An EU-Albania FTA is already in place since 2009, however, Bosnia is 
still waiting for the green light in this issue, albeit, Kosovo could not think about an 
FTA with the EU until all member states do not agree on a common stance regarding 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence. 
 In the following chapter I will present the factors involved and the possible 
implications of the slow process and Turkey’s EU membership prospects for the 
Balkans. 
 
 
4.1 Turkey: fresh start, gloomy outlooks 
 
Turkey has been an associate member of the EU since 1964 and an official 
candidate country since 1999. Despite Turkey being a partner of the EU for decades, 
the country is still not a member of the block. 
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 In the mid-1990s, the question of EU integration in Turkey was one of the major 
foreign policy issues which has significantly divided Kemalists and Islamists. 318 
However, after the AK Party’s victory in the general elections in 2002, the picture 
changed completely, the newly elected PM, Erdogan clearly embraced his country’s 
EU integration. He toured around European capitals to promote his government’s EU 
integration commitment and also started a campaign at home to increase the support 
of Turkey’s EU membership. 
2003 and 2004 were the heydays of this process, the consensual political 
atmosphere in Turkey made space for several major reforms in the field of the 
Turkish legal, constitutional and administrative structure and an economic 
liberalisation process also followed due course. 
However, the bright future started to fade around late 2004 and 2005, despite the 
EU officially opened accession negotiations with Turkey in late 2005, disillusionment 
spread in Turkey.319 The reasons for this were multifold: the hesitation of several EU 
member states, the feeling of treating Turkey as a second-class partner and the 
unresolved issue of the divided island of Cyprus – Turkey not allowed any Greek 
Cypriot ships and airplanes to enter its harbours and airports and the Greek Cypriots’ 
vote against the “Annan-plan” – contributed to the changed atmosphere. The EU 
blocked five chapters of the 33 required for membership because of Turkish 
reluctance to let in Greek Cypriot ships and aircrafts. In addition, the French and 
Dutch “No-s” in the referendum on the constitutional treaty also cooled down the 
situation. 
Nicholas Sarkozy’s election as president of France also added to the negative side 
of the EU-Turkey relations. Sarkozy started to speak out openly against the 
accession of Turkey, France blocked five more chapters and with Cyprus blocking 
another ones, leaving 17 chapters blocked altogether, there is really few space for 
opening other ones to the 13 already opened chapters.320 Major western European 
countries also became disappointed and dissatisfied with the eastern European 
enlargement, known as the “enlargement fatigue”, especially the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 proved to be hurried off. 
The discourse on Turkey’s EU accession started to shove off from full membership 
to the position of “privileged partnership”, which seems unacceptable for the current 
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Turkish government. The possible accession of Turkey revolves around internal EU 
issues in the 27 member community.321 The recent economic and eurocrisis also 
contributed to the enlargement scepticism. The negotiation process of Turkey’s EU 
accession got stuck, the reset button has not been found yet. 
  
 
4.2. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo: there is a long way to go 
 
The western Balkans is currently a “white spot” for the EU. All countries, except for 
Kosovo, have signed Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU 
during the first decade of this century, this is considered as the first step before 
applying for membership. EU integration is supported by the public and politicians in 
almost all countries in the region.322 The speed of the EU accession in these states is 
mainly determined by the states’ internal matters – Kosovo partly excluded from this 
list here –, the EU’s own internal situation, like with Turkey, plays a lesser role here.  
While Croatia is on the edge of becoming a full member of the 27 member block 
possibly as soon as next year, Macedonia and Montenegro have official candidate 
status but negotiations have not been started.323 Albania and Serbia have applied for 
membership, however, Albania’s application was rejected due to the political crisis in 
the country324 and Serbia’s application has not been assessed yet (the answer can 
be expected in October 2011).325 Bosnia and Herzegovina faces several obstacles in 
becoming a candidate country, including the still presence of the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR)326 and the ethnic division of the country.327 The main problems 
with Kosovo’s EU integration is that unless there is no common opinion on its 
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declaration of independence in the EU and Kosovo’s disputes with Serbia are not 
settled,328 no process can be made here. 
 
No clear EU accession date has been set either for Turkey or the three Balkan 
countries. However, it is expected that Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo might join the EU in the second part of this decade but the discourse on 
Turkey’s accession seems to be going on for a while. 
 
4.2.1 Albania 
 
As the European Commission stated, the main problem with Albania’s EU 
integration process is the political crisis in the country, the lack of dialogue between 
the government and opposition since the 2009 parliamentary elections. 329  The 
political dialogue is confrontative and unconstructive, the parliament does not 
exercise effective control over the government and the scrutiny of legislative 
development is weak. Besides this, Albania also needs to tackle corruption, 
organised crime, smuggling and reform the judiciary to win a green light for the 
official candidate status.330  
There is a visa-free travel agreement between the EU – the Schengen area 
participating countries actually – and Albania, which took effect in December 2010.331 
 
4.2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The main problem, besides the presence of the OHR and official defiance of this 
institution’s authority by the Republika Srpka,332 in Bosnia is that state institutions do 
not function properly, the federal structure and the ethnically divided country are not 
able to handle the reforms which are definitely needed to proceed with EU candidacy 
talks. Despite the country is on a path of slow but steady progress – for example co-
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operation with the war crime tribunal in The Hague –,333 constitutional reforms are 
also required for further co-operation with the EU. 
There is a visa-free travel agreement between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which took effect in December 2010. 
 
4.2.3 Kosovo 
 
From the three Balkan countries in this row, Kosovo’s EU accession seems to be 
the most far away. Due to the reason that not all of the 27 members of the EU have 
recognised Kosovo’s independence, the EU is not likely to sign any contracts with 
Kosovo, therefore an SAA could also not take effect.334 Kosovo also needs to tackle 
crime, corruption, strengthen the rule of law, media freedom and to guarantee the 
political stability and security for all communities in Kosovo.335 Political interference 
into the judiciary is also a major problem in the country.336 
 
 
4.3 EU membership not in sight: implications for Turkey and the three 
countries in focus 
 
As we have seen, no rapid EU accession is expected for Turkey and the three 
Balkan countries. On the other hand, all of these countries have reiterated that they 
see their future in Europe – and NATO –, no other alternatives are possible. However, 
until EU accession is reached there is some time to go. 
The implications of Turkey’s EU accession process in the Balkans are diverse. First 
of all, there has been some suggestions 337  that, given Turkey’s successful EU 
facilitated political and economic reforms, Turkey could serve as a model state 
among Balkan countries. The EU has praised Turkish reforms several times in recent 
years and this could be an impetus for Balkan countries to proceed with such an 
agenda – they see an example which is positively graded. However, due to the fact 
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that the EU – and its officials – are phisically present in Bosnia and Kosovo, Turkey’s 
model role might be rather limited, the EU is directly involved in those two states,338 
and the reforms are to be done by local politicians, authorities – not the EU. 
Secondly, as all the remaining Balkan states will step on the path for EU candidacy, 
the common lobby force of these states would increase in negotiating with the EU, if 
common issues come up.339 Emphasising the common heritage, cultural bonds could 
provide additional means for co-operation in this field. In addition, as Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo maintain good relations with Turkey, Turkey’s voice in 
these potential EU candidate countries could also be valued more, as an 
experienced partner of the EU, Turkey could provide useful information – regarding 
EU accession negotiations – for these countries. Although, the block accession – like 
those of the eastern European states in 2004 – of these countries into the EU is 
rather unlikely and this could weaken this common lobby force. 
 
Perhaps the most important part of these implications is economy. This issue has 
two points worth to mention. First, until the western Balkans is not incorporated into 
the EU, and do not have access to the common market, Turkey is a great partner to 
trade with. Turkish exports to Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo are increasing and the 
number is not expected to stall or decrease in the near future. FTAs are in place 
between Turkey and the individual countries (with Kosovo it is expected to take place 
soon) to facilitate trade. The possibility for Albanian, Bosnian and Kosovar companies 
to export easily to Turkey is also increasing. Turkish investments, compared to their 
previously low levels these countries, are also increasing rapidly. The emphasis of 
the common past, cultural bonds and Ottoman heritage in the economic relations too 
makes the trade and investments more smooth. 
 
The other aspect of the prolonged EU accession negotiations is that Turkey is a 
more dominant player, than any other Balkan countries. Turkish politicians, 
businessmen are keen to focus on the region and there is a huge trade surplus for 
Turkey with these countries. Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo are relatively poor countries. 
The amount of FDI they could export is rather limited, Turkey dominates the trade 
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International Peace. December 2010. 7 April 2011 <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/turkey_new_foreign 
_policy.pdf>. 
339 However, because Turkey more ahead in EU accession talks this issue might be limited, Turkey’s interests 
are not to wait for the other candidate countries to catch up. 
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and investments, Turkish companies are able to invest in the region. Therefore, 
despite the sometimes unstable political situation in these countries, Turkey 
consistently buys up companies there – at a good price. These assets, once the 
region will be inside the EU would be valued more and have access to the common 
market, which Turkish companies – in case of Turkey will not become an EU member 
– would be able to achieve with more difficult conditions. However, the investments in 
these countries serve mutual interests: the governments of Albania, Bosnia and 
Kosovo are eagerly looking for any foreign investment to speed up economic growth 
in order to modernise their economies and Turkey seems to be an eligible and 
adequate partner for deeper co-operation. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There has been great changes in Turkey’s Balkan oriented foreign policy in the past 
decade. The political events in the region and the reshaping policy of a new Turkish 
governing party resulted in a much different approach to the Balkans – then it was in 
the previous decades. 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo occupy important and special 
position in Turkish foreign policy, as it is voiced on many occasions by leading 
Turkish politicians and businessmen. This opinion, albeit with less emphasis, is also 
voiced by Albanian, Kosovar and Bosniak politicians and businessmen too. Turkey 
feels that not only diplomatic and economic relations are needed in the policy toward 
these countries, but to explore other fields of co-operation, including cultural, 
educational, humanitarian and military ones too. Common religious ties and the focus 
on the positive aspects of the Ottoman past, the positive perception of the Ottoman 
heritage in these countries – not in whole of Bosnia –, also contribute to this special 
atmosphere and relationships. 
The Turkish approach is more than a foreign policy initiative, it goes beyond it. 
Turkey’s influence, Turkish Islam, companies, schools, TV-shows etc. have spread 
around the western Balkans, especially in the last 5-6 years. With fast EU 
membership prospects for these countries fading, co-operation with Turkey is 
observed more and more positively by the governments of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – the Federation part – and Kosovo. Claims, that Turkey’s approach 
toward these countries is neo-Ottomanist, have some groundings. However, this neo-
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Ottomanism is not that most of the experts use in connection with this topic. The 
portrayal of neo-Ottomanism as an imperial approach and as a policy to spread its 
sphere of influence is no longer valid because these expressions have lost their 
meanings in today’s international relations frame of reference. Multilateralism, the 
involvement of all actors in the region to foster relations is the way how Turkey 
moves forward in the Balkans. 
On the other hand, we can not just simply label the Turkish foreign policy directed 
toward this region as a “new foreign policy approach” because it might be new, but 
the approach is more than strengthening political and economic ties. Neo-
Ottomanism, with new elements and branding, that can be of today’s Turkish foreign 
policy in these countries. 
Turkey’s relations with these three countries spread into many fields, the citizens of 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo could face with the increasing 
relations with Turkey even in their homes (TV-shows). However, Turkey’s 
approximation is not perceived with negative sentiments by the majority of the people 
residing in these countries: citizens look at Turkey as a friend and Turkish 
involvement in several layers of the society is supported by local politicians too. The 
mutual benefits started to overrule past disagreements and perceived prejudices. The 
“win-win” situation, as described by Davutoglu, fits for everyone so far. In addition, if 
populist and nationalist rhetoric would also cool down in several areas – mainly in the 
Bosnian Serb entity – a more solid co-operation could start with these territories too. 
The Serbs’ suspicion is a factor which Turkey needs to tackle in the upcoming years. 
There is also a high chance of this due to Serbia’s currently friendly relations with 
Turkey,340 this results in that Serbs politicians in Bosnia are losing support for anti-
Turkey policies. 
The economic aspect, which Turkey is promoting in its new foreign policy approach, 
also shows great developments. Turkish investments into the region have just started 
to arrive on a bigger scale and the pace of further investments will possibly increase 
in the near future, as economic growth will catch up in these countries and a more 
business friendly environment would develop. However, the level of Turkish trade 
and investments with these countries still lags behind those of the other Balkan 
countries, like Greece or Serbia, but the trend is changing. The economic emphasis 
in the relations aims to intertwine the economies of these countries with Turkey’s to a 
                                                 
340 In addition, no major actors want Bosnia and Herzegovina to be divided, including Turkey, the EU, Serbia 
and Croatia too. 
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level, which would exclude any major further conflicts, facilitate stability and to a level, 
which was previously unthinkable. 
 
I would argue that neo-Ottomanism, under the changed meaning, is the main 
driving policy in these countries, the direction is visible. The hypothesis of the thesis 
seems to be valid. The examples, trends and all other aspects mentioned in the 
thesis point to a different foreign policy, a pragmatist and mutual benefit-seeking 
approach concentrating on the common past and ties. Claims, that there is no 
overarching neo-Ottomanist policy regarding the Balkans may have some 
foundations, however, neo-Ottomanism in Turkey’s relations with individual countries 
appears and these bilateral relations also add up to a multilateral picture in this 
region. 
The other factors of the new Turkish foreign policy approach, the zero problems 
policy and the country’s mediating role also contribute to the increasing role of Turkey 
in the Balkans. Successful negotiations between Bosnia and Serbia and the offer to 
take part in the Kosovo-Serbia talks are examples when Turkey was able to 
overcome its previous foreign policy objectives toward the region (e.g. no 
interference) and pursue with a constructive approach. 
 
The future of neo-Ottomanism in these countries and the region could take diverse 
curves in the upcoming years. Nevertheless, the most possible scenario for the 
following years is that these countries enhance co-operation with Turkey in all fields, 
strengthen their relations for mutual benefits to speed up economic growth with the 
help of Turkish investments. This would also reduce several social problems, 
including unemployment, which in many occasions are the roots of wider difficulties 
(e.g. ethnic tensions). 
The main issue here is that all three countries have certain issues which could slow 
this political and economic normalisation. The ethnic division in Bosnia, Kosovo’s 
disputed status and the political stalemate in Albania are the grand factors which we 
currently do not know when will come to a still point. These problems affect the 
relations with Turkey and the EU, like Albania’s rejection of EU candidate status. 
Moreover, the EU is also an important, perhaps the most important player in the 
region and Turkey knows that without the consent and agreement of the 27 member 
block, the future of the region could not be imagined. However, this is true for Turkey 
too, without Europe’s biggest Muslim country no major breakthroughs can be 
achieved in the Balkans. The interdependence of the two entities in shaping the 
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political and economic image of the Balkans is obvious, but the realisation of the co-
operation for these states for a better future is rather bumpy and ambigious. Cengiz 
Aktar mentioned that the lack of this co-operation between the EU and Turkey in the 
Balkans causes disturbances and doubts in both sides about the other’s intentions. 
This notion is of crucial significance: Turkey is aiming at full EU membership, but it is 
not a usual candidate country, its means are able to pursue an independent and 
confident foreign policy in the EU’s backyard which are sometimes not 100 percent 
parallel with those of the EU. Turkey’s neo-Ottomanism also belongs to this category. 
 
The success, depends on what we consider as success of neo-Ottomanism – 
increasing public support for Turkey? Enhanced economic co-operation? Friendly 
political relations? Culture as a driving factor in relations? etc. – in these countries is 
uncertain. Albania, as the country with which Turkey has the longest relations from 
this group, is perhaps the state which is on the way to become a success story for 
this Turkish foreign policy in the region. The emphasis which politicians and 
businessmen put on the excellent relations between the two countries and the 
public’s reshaping attitude, thanks Turkish schools and other cultural elements, are 
point to the positive realisation of this policy. Kosovo is also following Albania in this 
line, however, due to the fresh and new relations with Turkey, the volume is lagging 
behind those of Albania but the intensity, how the public supports Turkey is really 
visible. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the country where the ethnic division also divides 
the success of this policy for Turkey: the more the division exists and deepens, the 
more Turkey is seen in Republika Srpska as an “alien” actor in this field. Unless 
Turkey is not able to change the Bosnian Serbs’ opinion and perception about its 
policies and itself, success can not be achieved in this field. 
 
There has been a new foreign policy paradigm shaping in Turkey, which is more 
confident and assertive than previous Turkish foreign policies. Turkey is more aware 
of its geostrategic, economic, demographical and cultural peculiarities and weight. 
The country uses these advantages to pursue its aims in the international arena. The 
Balkans is one of the most important “laboratories” of this Turkish foreign policy in the 
ex-Ottoman field, neo-Ottomanism is the driving force behind this policy which also 
brought new impetus into the region. 
 
 
 
 86
ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis examines the aspects of neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policies 
toward three Balkan countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo –, 
focusing on the developments of the last decade. Turkey has become quite active in 
the Balkans and in these countries in the last few years, however, this activism is not 
without any antecendents. These areas were the core European territories of the 
Ottoman Empire and after the dissolution of this entity, Turkey still attached special 
importance to these countries, albeit during the Cold War relations were cooler. On 
the other hand, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the rise of the AK Party to government 
position and Ahmet Davutoglu becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs in Turkey, the 
Balkans started to receive particular “limelight” in Turkish foreign policy. New ideas, 
expressions, approaches were incorporated into the forming self-confident and 
assertive foreign policy of Turkey. However, this new policy, referred to as neo-
Ottomanism in many cases, infered criticisms too, from the West and from local 
politicians in the Balkans too. The thesis aims to remake and remodel this expression 
by highlighting other, more positive elements of it. Turkey’s political, economic, 
cultural and military relations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are 
developing at an unprecedented pace these days but the Ottoman past and ethnic 
divisions cast doubts in some occasions on Turkey’s intentions. Nonetheless, 
economy is more and more becoming the driving factor in relations, with Turkish 
investments soaring in these countries. In addition, the perception of the Ottoman 
past is also changing in these countries, with major shifts in some states in favour of 
Turkish involvement. However, the increased relations with Turkey remain highly 
debated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where this issue is also in connection with the 
country’s ethnic division. All four countries aim at EU membership, but there are 
various obstacles which set back their progress. The implications of the fading fast 
membership progress pushes Turkey and the other three countries for enhanced co-
operation, mainly in the field of economy, to get the most out of bilateral – and 
multilateral – relations. The thesis attempts to highlight that most of the factors of the 
current Turkish foreign policy in this region underline the approach of neo-
Ottomanism, however, this approach is more beneficiary than disadvantegous for all 
sides and the involved actors observe Turkish approximation mostly positively. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
Personal interview with Harun Karcic – made on 4th Marc 2011 –, a Sarajevo based 
former researcher at the Roberto Ruffilli Faculty of Political Sciences at the University 
of Bologna and a member of Islam in South East Europe Forum (ISEEF) 
How would you describe the new foreign policy of Turkey? What elements of it are 
worth to mention? Neo-Ottomanism is a controversial expression, often used by the 
Western media. What is your opinion on this expression? How do you try to grab the 
key focuses of the argument around the expression? 
First of all, Ottomanism was a term coined by Ottoman statesmen in the 19th 
century to try and forge a common Ottoman identity in the wake of ever stronger 
nationalist movements in the Balkans and Middle East which threatened the political 
and social stability of the Empire. The term never had any connotation to Ottoman 
foreign policy, it was simply an attempt at forging a common identity. Hence, labeling 
Turkish foreign policy as 'neo-Ottoman' is simply wrong. I would simply label it as the 
'new Turkish foreign policy'. We have to bear in mind that Turkey has been largely 
ignoring its neighboring countries (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Armenia, Greece) in the 
last couple of decades. It was desperately trying to get closer to the Europe, and 
applied for EEC membership a few decades ago. However, Europe has been divided 
on Turkey's entrance and Turkish leadership and the ordinary people became 
increasingly frustrated with the EU. Since the AKP came to power, the Turkish 
leadership tried to make use of its immediate neighborhood for its own economic gain 
as well as for political stability.  
Turkey has become quite active on the Balkans in the last decade too. What is the 
reason of this? Why Turkey started to focus on this region and how Turkey is 
pursuing its policy aims in these countries? 
Turkish foreign policy must be observed from a higher perspective. In 2009 alone, 
the Turkish Foreign minister (Ali Babacan, and after 1 May Ahmet Davutoglu) paid 93 
official visits: 47 to Europe, 15 to Asia, 23 to Middle East, and 9 to USA. From this we 
see that Turkish foreign policy has been West oriented and of these countries, the 
Balkans received the least number of visits. If Davutoglu's visits to the Balkans are 
only observed, it may seem that Turkey has become more active in the Balkans. If 
however Turkeys overall European visits are observed, we see that there is a general 
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trend in pro-active Turkish foreign policy. Also, Davutolgu, being an international 
relations professor knows well that any tremor in the Balkans or Caucasus will be felt 
in Turkey. In the last 130 years alone, the Austro-hungarian occupation of Bosnia, 
the first and second Balkan wars, the first and second World Wars, the expulsion of 
ethnic Turks from Bulgaria (1960s, 1970s, 1989) resulted in hundreds of thousands 
of refugees being expelled to Turkey. For this reason, Davutoglu has realized that in 
order for Turkey to be in peace and stability and not overwhelmed with Balkan 
refugees, there must be peace and stability in the Balkans. His activism resulted in 
Serbia accepting a Bosnian ambassador after 3 years of a stalemate, in Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Serbia signing the Istanbul Declaration on stability and cooperation, in 
the Serbian parliament passing the resolution of Srebrenica, and in Turkey and 
Serbia signing a free trade agreement.     
 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are countries, where there is a 
strong Muslim population, in Albania and Kosovo there is a Muslim majority. Does 
religion play a role in Turkey's Balkans approaches? Does Turkey use the religious 
connection to proceed with its foreign policy? 
 
Islam does not play a role in Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans. Turkey today has 
greater trade with Orthodox majority countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, 
and Serbia than it has with Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo. (You can check official 
statistics on Turkeys foreign trade). Although Turkey could use its religious 
connections in the Balkans, Balkan Muslims are, after half a century of communism, 
too secularized to see it as a major link.  
Turkey has become active not just in the political, but in the economic field too in 
these three countries. What advantages/disadvantages could emerge from this? 
Which sectors might be affected the most? 
Turkish products are of relatively good quality and are much cheaper than imported 
Slovenian, Austrian, or German products. Greater trade with Turkey will provide the 
Balkans with cheaper and good quality goods which will be affordable to a greater 
population.  
How the politicians, decision makers, business community and every day people, 
the population of these three countries observe Turkey's approaches? What is their 
opinion on Turkey's policies? For or against? 
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I can only speak for Bosnia here as I am most familiar. Bosniaks and Croats were 
generally friendly towards Turkeys activism in the Balkans. Bosnian Serbs generally 
have an aversion towards Turkey, and Milorad Dodik was a major figure in spreading 
this animosity. However, after a recent visit to Banja Luka by Davutoglu and his 
meeting with Dodik, Dodik changed his attitude and at a press conference even 
declared that he supports Turkeys engagement in Bosnia and that he sees Turkey as 
a partner in Bosnia’s stability. I do not know the reasons for such a swift change in 
attitude. 
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Appendix 2. 
 
Personal interview with Cengiz Aktar – made on 11th April 2011 –, Professor at 
Turkey’s Bahcesehir University and the Chairman of the Department of EU Relations. 
 
The interview can be found on two mp3 files provided on the CD attached or in the 
uploaded version of the thesis. 
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Appendix 3. 
Maps, charts 
 
1. The Ottoman Empire in the 19th century 
 
 
Source: STRATFOR. Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. 22 April 2011. <http://web.stratfor.com/im 
ages/maps/Balkans_Boundaries_v2_800.jpg>. 
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2. Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives in the Balkans 
 
 
Source: STRATFOR. Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives in the Balkans. 22 April 2011. <http://web.stratfor 
.com/images/maps/balkan_influence_800.jpg>. 
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3. Turkey’s Economic Presence in the Balkans 
 
 
Source: STRATFOR. Turkey’s Economic Presence in the Balkans. 23 April 2011. <http://web.str 
atfor.com/images/maps/turk_balkan-ties_800.jpg>. 
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Appendix 4. 
 
Photos of determining, important politicians mentioned in the thesis. All photos are 
free to be copied, distributied, shared and remixed (no copyright) – with proper 
attribution under Creative Commons licences.  
 
 
1. Ahmet Davutoglu 
 
 
Source: Kathrin Möbius, Munich Security Conference. Munich Security Conferen- 
ce 2010. 20 April 2011. <http://www.securityconference.de/Saturday-17-00-19-00-
Uhr.589.0.html?&L=1>. 
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2. Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
 
 
Source: Flickr, World Economic Forum. World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 
 2009. 21 April 2011. <http://www.flickr.com/photos/worldeconomicforum/348804 
9687/ >. 
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3. Abdullah Gül 
 
 
Source: Flickr, World Economic Forum. World Economic Forum  
Annual Meeting 2007. <http://www.flickr.com/photos/15237218@ 
N00/374717721/>. 
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4. Milorad Dodik 
 
 
Source: Flickr, Demokratska Stranka. Electoral Meeting of the Democratic Party 
 (DS) of Serbia. 20 April 2011. <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Milorad_Do 
dik_mod.jpg>. 
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5. Bakir Izetbegovic 
 
 
Source: Flickr, European People’s Party. EPP Summit December 2010. <http:/ 
/www.flickr.com/photos/eppofficial/5266299267/>. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 117
 
 
 
6. Sali Berisha 
 
 
Source: Flickr, European People’s Party. EPP Congress Bonn 2009. <http://www. 
flickr.com/photos/eppofficial/5016885181/>. 
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7. Bamir Topi 
 
 
Source: Lorenza e Vincenzo Iaconianni, Fotoguru.it. Bamir Topi. 
22 April 2011. <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/ 
5/58/Bamir_Topi_2.jpg>. 
8.   Hashim Thaci 
 
 
Source: Wikimedia, White House. Hashim Thaci. 22 April  
2011.<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Bu 
sh_with_leaders_of_Kosovo.jpg>. 
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Appendix 5. 
 
I have made an audio slideshow on my recent visit to Istanbul as an illustration of 
Turkey’s – and Turkey’s foreign policy’s – position between East and West. The 
video can be watched on the CD attached, on my personal webpage on this link 
(http://harsfatea.posterous.com/istanbul-commuters-on-the-bosphorus) or can be 
found in the uploaded version of the thesis. 
 
